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Two opposing paradigms, analyses via frequentist or Bayesian methods, dominate the 
statistical literature. Most commonly, frequentist approaches have been used to design and analyze 
clinical trials, though Bayesian techniques are becoming increasingly popular. However, these two 
paradigms can generate divergent results even in analyses of the same trial data, which may harm 
the scientific interpretability of the trial. Therefore, it is crucial to harmonize analyses under each 
approach. In this dissertation, novel unified approaches for one-sided frequentist and Bayesian 
hypothesis testing problems comparing two proportions in fixed-sample and group-sequential 
clinical trials are proposed. When a frequentist design with desired type I and II error rates are 
given, the unification is achieved by deriving specific Bayesian decision thresholds and sample 
sizes. Similarly, when a Bayesian design is given, the unification is achieved by deriving 
corresponding frequentist characteristics. In addition, theoretical methods to determine the 
Bayesian decision threshold, sample size and power are provided. Numerical results show that the 
unified approach can yield the same type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis 
tests through a numerical study. Further, detailed evaluations suggest that Bayesian priors 
specifications, allocation ratios, number of analyses can affect the resulting Bayesian sample sizes 
and decision thresholds. Overall, the unified approach can be adopted into the current clinical trial 
setting and is helpful to make trial results translatable between frequentist and Bayesian methods.  
Keywords: clinical trials, Bayesian design, frequentist design, hypothesis testing, unification, 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Introduction 
Frequentist and Bayesian approaches are two opposing paradigms commonly used in statistical 
inferences. The root of the disagreement between these two approaches lies in their fundamental 
philosophies. For example, in a clinical trial, clinical trialists are interested in finding the 
probability of success for a new treatment (i.e, the treatment effect). Frequentist methods, or called 
the classical methods, consider the treatment on each patient as an independent experiment and 
repeat the experiment for multiple times by enrolling a number of patients. The average success 
rate of multiple experiments approximates the true value of the probability of success for the new 
treatment.  
In contrast, Bayesian approaches consider the probability of success as an uncertain 
quantity and associate the treatment effect with a probability distribution at the beginning of the 
trial. Those probability distributions are called prior distributions, as they often represent a priori 
knowledge about the effect the new treatment would have. When clinical trial data is collected, 
Bayesian methods update the probability distribution for treatment effect with evidence observed 
from the data. The evidence is also called the data likelihood, which represents the amount of 
information provided by data on the treatment effect. The updated probability distribution is 
referred to as the posterior distribution.    
The fundamental disagreement between frequentist and Bayesian paradigms has led to a 
philosophical debate on which paradigm is superior for decades. Although it is mentioned in many 
publications, that frequentist approaches have dominated the statistical analysis since the early 20th 
century (Feigelson, Loredo, & Building, 1992; Greenland, 2006; Gupta, 2012; Kass, 2011; J. J. 
Lee & Chu, 2012). The early popularity of frequentist methods is largely due to frequentist 
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probability calculations do not involve many computations, whereas Bayesian methods can have 
complicated calculations and often demand computer powers that are unattainable in early days (J. 
J. Lee & Chu, 2012). To be more specific, frequentist probability calculations usually have closed-
form solutions that allow quickly being computed, whereas Bayesian probability calculations only 
have closed-form solution under certain assumptions (e.g. the conjugate priors, for which the prior 
and the posterior distribution follows the same family of distribution). In addition, Bayesian 
methods can have hierarchical structures, which introduce uncertainty to parameters of the prior 
distribution.  As a result, Bayesian probability calculations can be computationally intensive.  
In clinical trials, frequentist methods have been the dominant paradigm since the first 
modern trial carried out in the 1940s (Gupta, 2012; J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012).  Over the past decades, 
the medical community and regulatory agencies have adopted frequentist approaches as the testing 
standard in clinical trials (Teira, 2011). However, recent computational advance in software and 
computational power (e.g. Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo and WinBUGS) greatly facilitate the use 
of Bayesian techniques in statistical design and analysis including clinical trials. Formal 
acceptance from by the regulatory agencies (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017) and well established  
Bayesian standard methods (S. M. Berry, Carlin, Lee, & Muller, 2010) also help popularize 
Bayesian methods in clinical trials. 
There are several purported advantages of using Bayesian approaches in clinical trials. First, 
Bayesian results are more related to clinician's question than frequentist results. For example, a 
clinician may ask, ‘How likely is that our experimental treatment to be better than the control?’, 
or ‘What is the probability of our null hypothesis to be true?’. Frequentist statisticians draw 
conclusions for the hypothesis test based upon the significance test and the p-value. However, p-
values are not intuitive and are often misinterpreted as the probability of the null hypothesis to be 
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true by clinicians (Cohen, 2011; Goodman, 2008). In fact, the p-value should be interpreted as the 
probability of obtaining a treatment effect at least as extreme as the observed effect when the null 
hypothesis is true. Therefore, the p-value essentially is not answering the clinician’s questions.  
In contrast, Bayesian methods allow to directly assign a probability distribution to the null 
hypothesis or a statement such as the experimental arm is superior to the control arm(D. A. Berry, 
2006). Thus, the definition of Bayesian probability is more intuitive in comparison with the 
frequentist definition of probability. Furthermore, The subsequent Bayesian updating and decision 
making is also an inherently sequential process (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). In addition, Bayesian 
methods enable to incorporate prior information for assessing treatment effects in clinical trials. 
Historical data from previous trials in a similar setting can provide valuable information and 
possibly reduce the sample size for clinical trials. For instance, Laptook et al. (2017) used a 
Bayesian analysis of the treatment effect of hypothermia in infants with hypoxic-ischemic 
encephalopathy (HIE). Because of the limited number of infants expected to enroll in their clinical 
trial, it is difficult to conduct a traditional statistical significance test. To resolve this problem, the 
authors incorporated historical data to yield a quantitative summary of the trial results. 
Nevertheless, there are controversial opinions about the use of Bayesian priors. On the 
other hand, Fayers et al. (1997) had made justifications for the use of prior in Bayesian approaches. 
The authors suggested that a pessimistic prior can reduce possibilities to wrongly draw a 
conclusion that there is overwhelm treatment effect. As such, an optimistic prior can lower the 
chances that an effective treatment is early terminated for futility. On the other hand, some clinical 
trialists are concerned with choosing appropriate prior distributions as selecting a prior can be 
subjective and biased (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). This is because clinical trialists often determine the 
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prior distribution based on their own knowledge about a treatment effect. As a result, people may 
end up using different priors on the same dataset and draw different conclusions. 
Discordance between conclusions makes trial results hard to interpret. Irony (2008) also 
found that the Bayesian inference was very sensitive to the prior variance addressing the cross-
variability of historical studies. If there is only one historical study, clinical trialists cannot 
precisely estimate the variance. Consequently, the prior information may lead to wrong posterior 
inference and decisions. Regulatory agencies, therefore, preclude the use of informative priors 
when there is not enough historical data (Teira, 2011).  
Gönen (2009) and Grieve (2016) have also discussed problems with available software in 
addition to prior selections. Lack of accessible user-friendly software can often discourage 
biostatisticians to use Bayesian methods because it is impossible for biostatisticians to write 
complex code every time to implement a Bayesian clinical trial design.  Moreover, regulatory 
authorities including the FDA often require frequentist concepts, such as type I and II error rates, 
to be rigorously controlled (D. A. Berry, 2006; FDA, 2014). However, the type I and II error rates 
are frequentist concepts and are not naturally considered Bayesian philosophies. This is because 
that type I and II error rates measure probabilities of making wrong conclusions about the 
hypotheses while Bayesian methods directly measure the probability of the hypothesis. Therefore, 
many Bayesian designs are carried out without explicit consideration of frequentist characteristics. 
Very often, clinical trialists have to perform simulations to adjust Bayesian tuning parameters to 
satisfy the respective type I and II error rates. However, tuning those parameters can influence the 
optimality of original Bayesian designs (Ventz & Trippa, 2014).  
Another problem is frequentist and Bayesian methods may differ in conclusions. When 
informative priors are used in Bayesian designs, clinical trialists may reach divergent conclusions 
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between Bayesian and frequentist inferences, even on the same data (FDA, 2014). The divergence 
harms the scientific merit of a clinical trial, as conclusions should be consistent across analytic 
methods. Consequently, there has been a long-time debate between frequentist and Bayesian 
clinical trialists about which one is advantageous to the other (Efron, 2005; D J Spiegelhalter, 
Freedman, & Parmar, 1994). 
Thus, it is important to consider unifying Bayesian and frequentist methods in clinical trials. 
Notably, statisticians have put a lot of effort to seek parallels between frequentist and Bayesian 
methods. Several statisticians have reconciled or calibrated one of the methods to the other for data 
analysis to reach the same conclusion. For instance, a prominent contribution is that Casella and 
Berger (1989) showed adjusting priors in Bayesian approaches can lead to the same inference as 
frequentist methods when analyzing data. However, such prior calibrations during the data analysis 
are inappropriate for clinical trials. In clinical trials, the statistical analysis is well planned at the 
design stage so it must be analyzed as planned during analysis. As such, many other methods of 
unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods are not applicable to clinical trials because of adjusting 
parameters during analysis. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the problem from the design stage 
to unify frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials. 
Several biostatisticians have made contributions regarding harmonizing frequentist and 
Bayesian methods at the design stage. Inoue, Berry, and Parmigiani (2005) considered unifying 
frequentist and Bayesian methods at the design stage. The authors found a correspondence between 
Bayesian and frequentist methods to generate the same sample size. However, the authors defined 
a specific classification error for Bayesian hypothesis testing rather than using type I and II error 
rates. The classification error makes it difficult to translate results between the frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches.   
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More recently, Zhu et al. (2015) considered a simulation-based approach to introduce alpha 
spending functions (DeMets & Lan, 1994; Lan & Demets, 1983) into Bayesian group sequential 
trials. The authors showed that the overall type I error rate is controlled under multiple types of 
alpha spending stopping boundaries. However, Zhu et al. required sample size to be pre-specified 
for calculating stopping boundaries, which conflicted with most trial planning processes where the 
sample size is determined once stopping boundaries are derived. Furthermore, the authors did not 
consider conditional distributions of posterior probabilities of multiple analyses, nor varying 
futility boundaries, which were often found in realistic group-sequential trials.  
Shi and Yin (2019)  proposed another method to control type I error rate in single boundary 
Bayesian group sequential trials. The method reduced the computation burden required by 
simulations and maintained the desired type I error rate. However, the authors did not consider 
stopping the trial for futility at the interim analysis. Although both Zhu et al. and Shi and Yin 
reconciled frequentist methods to Bayesian methods to some extent, the final results were sensitive 
to Bayesian prior specifications. To be more specific, the Bayesian type I error rate can vary 
because stopping boundaries are computed without taking prior distributions into account. 
Furthermore, the other frequentist concept, the type II error rate, may not be preserved as desired 
either, under different prior distributions. Overall, there is no available method to unify frequentist 
and Bayesian approaches on both type I and II error rates in clinical trials. 
To address the above issues and create an exact one-to-one mapping between frequentist 
and Bayesian group sequential methods given different Bayesian priors, we propose novel unified 
approaches for frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing problems in one-sided two-arm fixed-
sample and group-sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints. When a frequentist design is 
given, the unified approach determines the Bayesian sample size and decision thresholds through 
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a theoretical approach. When a Bayesian design is given, the unified approach calculates the 
frequentist type I and II error rates, leading to a corresponding frequentist design. For group-
sequential trials, alpha spending functions for controlling the overall type I error rate and beta 
spending function for controlling the overall type II error rate are utilized.  It is assumed that 
clinical trials have two arms with binary outcomes. Beta conjugate priors and decision makings 
based on posterior probabilities for treatment difference are used in Bayesian methods. Also, we 
derive the distributions of Bayesian posterior probabilities and provide closed-form solutions to 
compute Bayesian type I and II error rates in this dissertation work.   Additionally, a user-friendly 
software application implementing the proposed unified approaches has been built to allow ease 
of use by clinical trialists.  
Using the proposed unified approaches, a detailed numerical investigation is performed to 
compare frequentist and Bayesian approaches for different design parameters, such as Bayesian 
prior specifications, numbers of analyses, allocation ratios and stopping boundaries. The 
comparison is objective because the frequentist methods and Bayesian methods correspond to each 
other regarding the type I and II error rates. The influences of these design parameters on the 
Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes are also evaluated. Evaluation results can help 
clinical trialists to gain insights into the optimality of frequentist and Bayesian paradigms in 
clinical trials. 
Overall, the dissertation work has the following highlights: 
1. The dissertation establishes a 1-to-1 mapping between frequentist and Bayesian 
methods in clinical trials. This mapping achieves the unification of frequentist and 
Bayesian without adjusting any tuning parameters. Therefore, the unified 
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approaches can lower the entry point to Bayesian methods for some frequentist 
clinical trialists, as well as help Bayesian biostatisticians embrace classical methods. 
2. The unified approaches inherit the classical frequentist approach for fixed sample 
clinical trials and group-sequential clinical trials(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000; 
Lachin, 1981), which is conceptually easy to frequentist clinical trialists. From the 
perspectives from Bayesian biostatisticians, The proposed theoretical methods can 
help to rid of long-time simulations and obtain frequentist characteristics quickly. 
3. Further evaluations show that frequentist and Bayesian methods can outperform 
each other with respect to sample sizes under the circumstance. Results indicate 
that frequentist and Bayesian methods both can play important roles in clinical trials. 
Thus, the dissertation can help clinical trialists to select the optimal method 
regarding the sample sizes in real practice. 
Note, before developing novel unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian methods in 
clinical trials, a careful literature review is conducted to help crystalize our specific aims. The 
entire process of the literature review is displayed in Figure 1.1 in appendix section 1.5. The 
review starts with understanding frequentist and Bayesian methods and their conflicts. Then the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Bayesian approach are reviewed. Finally, existing approaches 
to reconciling or unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods are reviewed.  
The rest of this chapter summarizes the literature review results and is structured as follows.  
Chapter 1.2 and 1.3, briefly introduce frequentist and Bayesian methods, with some advantages 
and pitfalls which have been stated in the literature. Most of the frequentist and Bayesian methods 
introduced are used to develop the novel unified approaches in the following chapters. In Chapter 
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1.4, a detailed review summarizes previous work on exploring correspondences between the 
frequentist and Bayesian methods is present.   
1.2 Frequentist Methods 
1.2.1 Frequentist Philosophy 
The frequentist paradigm originates from the concepts of p-value and hypothesis testing. The p-
value was proposed by Ronald Fisher in the 1920s as indices of the strength of the evidence against 
the null hypothesis; it represents the probability of obtaining data equal to or more extreme than 
the observed one if the null is true. Commonly, statisticians degrade the p-value into dichotomy 
based on some decision threshold. Fisher suggested a p-value of 0.05 or less as indicating strong 
evidence against the null.  
Instead, Neyman and Pearson proposed a hypothesis-testing framework, in which they 
defined type I and II error rates, denoted as 𝛼 and 𝛽, and a decision threshold (or called the critical 
value by frequentist statisticians), denoted as c. The type I error rate is defined as the probability 
to accept an alternative hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true, whereas the type II error rate 
is defined as the probability of failing to reject the null when the alternative is true. For the given 
type I and II error rates, the decision threshold can be specified. In the hypothesis testing 
framework, a test statistic, denoted as 𝑇, is calculated in each hypothesis test. The null hypothesis 
is rejected if the test statistic 𝑇 is greater than the pre-specified decision threshold c. If the test 
statistic falls into above the decision threshold, the null hypothesis is rejected. Although p value 
and Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing are different concepts, current frequentist methods 
combine them together in practice. For instance, one can reject the null in a normal test at a 
significance level of 0.05, either using the decision threshold of 1.96  or the p value of 0.05. 
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1.2.2 Frequentist Hypothesis Testing  
Typically, a frequentist hypothesis test involves a null hypothesis, denoted as 𝐻0, and an 
alternative hypothesis, denoted as 𝐻1. In clinical trials comparing success rates  (denoted as  𝜋1 and  
𝜋2) between two treatments, the 𝐻0 is often stated such that success rates of the experimental and 
control groups are not different (i.e. 𝐻0: 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 ). The alternative hypothesis can be one-sided or 
two sided. In one-sided tests, the 𝐻1 is stated such that the success rate of the experimental arm is 
greater than that of the control (i.e. 𝐻1: 𝜋1 > 𝜋2) or the mortality rate of the experimental arm is 
smaller than that of the control (i.e. 𝐻1: 𝜋1 < 𝜋2). In two-sided tests, the 𝐻1 is stated such that the 
success rate of the experimental arm is either greater or smaller than that of the control (i.e. 
𝐻1: 𝜋1 ≠ 𝜋2).  Sometimes, the null hypothesis can be stated also as the rate difference between the 
experimental arm and the control arm is less than a minimal clinical meaningful significance, ∆. 
That is, 𝐻0: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆. Correspondingly, the alternative hypothesis can be stated as success 
rates between the experimental arm and the control arm is greater than ∆, 𝐻1: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆.   
When performing a hypothesis test, frequentist philosophy considers probabilities as 
frequencies. That is, 𝜋1 and 𝜋2, are meaningful only when they are considered as the limit of a 





, 𝑖 = 1,2, 
where the subscript i is used to denote treatment groups, 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 are the number of events and 
number of trials. It can be seen that 𝜋1  and 𝜋2  are fixed numbers and have no associated 
probability distributions. Since it is impossible to conduct endless experiments and obtain the value 
of 𝜋, the mean of the sample, denoted as ?̂?, is often used to approximate 𝜋. ?̂?, however, has a 
distribution conditional on the value of 𝜋.    
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Furthermore, assume there are multiple sample means, ?̂?.1 , ?̂?.2, … , ?̂?.𝑚 of m samples 
collected from the population, the frequentist central limit theorem states that the sampling 
distribution follows a normal distribution regardless of what the original distribution 𝜋 has. The 
resulting normal distribution makes it convenient to perform the frequentist hypothesis test and 
sample size calculation. For the hypothesis testing problem, the test statistic 𝑇 is constructed based 
on the sampling distribution. For instance, assume there is a clinical trial comparing two treatments, 










Using the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing framework, the decision threshold c is defined as 
𝑍1−𝛼, where 𝑍1−𝛼 is the (1 − 𝛼)𝑡ℎ quantile of the standard normal distribution. Alternatively, we 
can calculate the p value by subtracting the percentile of T evaluated at the standard normal 
distribution from one, and compare the p value to a threshold value, e.g. 0.05. The threshold is also 
called the significance level. 
1.2.3 Freuqentist Sample Size Determination for Fixed-Sample Methods 
Similar to the hypothesis testing problem, the frequentist sample size determination is 
based on the sampling distribution. Methods for calculating sample size for fixed-sample clinical 
trials comparing two proportions was illustrated in detail by Lachin (1981). The frequentist sample 
size calculation approach utilizes the relationship between type I and II error rates and the decision 
threshold (see Figure 1.2). Mostly, the sample size is chosen as the smallest value to control some 
pre-specified type I and II error rates. Consider the same clinical trial comparing two equal-sized 
treatment groups as in section 1.2.2, and let 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 denote the assumed treatment effect for two 








(𝑃1(1 − 𝑃1) + 𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2)), 𝑖 = 1,2, 
where 𝑍1−𝛼  and 𝑍1−𝛽  are the (1 − 𝛼)𝑡ℎ and (1 − 𝛽)𝑡ℎ quantile of the standard normal distribution. If 
patients are unequally assigned to two treatment arms with an allocation ratio 𝑟, 𝑟 ≠ 1, so that the 
patient size in the experimental arm is r times the size in the control arm. The sample sizes for the  











+ 𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2))
. 
Overall, the hypothesis testing and sample size determination are conceptually simple and 
the central limit theorem allows quick computation for results. Thus, frequentist approaches have 
been the predominant methods for modern clinical trial research since the 1940s (J. J. Lee & Chu, 
2012). The medical community and regulatory agencies have also adopted frequentist approaches 
as the testing standard in clinical trials (Teira, 2011). In addition, the ICH E-9 guidance largely 
refers to the use of frequentist methods when discussing hypothesis testing problems (ICH, 2017). 
1.2.3 Group-Sequential Methods 
For the above frequentist hypothesis tests and sample size determination for clinical trials, 
one assumption is that those clinical trials have only a final analysis when all patients recruited. 
Such fixed-sample design is unjustified for ethical and financial concerns because patients entered 
the study sequentially and the trial should be terminated when accumulated data is sufficient to 
conclude (Pocock, 1977).  Thus, frequentist group sequential methods are proposed to analyze 
clinical trial data (Peter Armitage, 1958; O’Brien & Fleming, 1979; Pocock, 1977). Armitage 
(1958) was the first person to introduce sequential method into clinical trials, and Pocock (1977) 
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and O’Brien and Fleming (1979) help polish the frequentist group-sequential methods for clinical 
trials. In group sequential clinical trials, the patients’ enrollment is partitioned into multiple stages. 
At the end of each stage, a hypothesis test is carried out on accumulating clinical trial data, where 
all statistical tests performed prior to the complete patient enrollment are called interim analyses. 
Suppose there are 𝐽 stages and let j denote the stage, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽. Let 𝑛.𝑗 denote the accumulated 











Note, 𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐽 follow a multivariate normal distribution (Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). That is, 
𝑇𝑗~𝑁 ((𝑃1 − 𝑃2)√𝐼𝑗 , 1) , where (𝑃1 − 𝑃2)√𝐼𝑗  is called a drift parameter and 𝐼𝑗  is the Fisher 
information available at the jth stage. Further, the covariance between 𝑇𝑗1  and 𝑇𝑗2 , 𝑗1 < 𝑗2  is 
√𝐼𝑗1/𝐼𝑗2 . 
In addition, the group-sequential design can have two decision thresholds for each analysis, 
one for efficacy, denoted as 𝑐𝐸,. and another for futility, denoted as 𝑐𝐹,.. The set of 𝑐𝐸,𝑗 and 𝑐𝐹,𝑗, 
𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽, are also called efficacy and futility stopping boundaries. The trial is stopped at the jth 
stage for overwhelming benefits of the experimental treatment if 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗,  or it is stopped for 
sufficient negative treatment effect if  𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗. Otherwise, the trial shall continue to the next 
analysis. Note, a final conclusion must be made at the final analysis, so that 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 is set to equal 𝑐𝐹,𝐽. 
Such group-sequential methods are ethically and economically beneficial, especially for 
confirmatory trials in which patient sample sizes are large.  
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Furthermore, these stopping boundaries are computed to achieve the desired type I and II 
error rates. Since repeated analyses are conducted in group-sequential clinical trials, it is widely 
acknowledged that the allowed type I error rate for each analysis has to be smaller than the desired 
type I error rate in order to preserve the overall type I error rate (Armitage, McPherson, & Rowe, 
1969; DeMets & Lan, 1994; O’Brien & Fleming, 1979; Pocock, 1977).  The overall type I error 
rate is usually the sum of the stagewise type I error rates and the same for the overall type II error 
rate. For instance, in group sequential trials with only efficacy boundaries, the following 
relationship between a set of efficacy boundary values and the overall type I error rate should be 
met: 






= 𝛼,  
and for group sequential trials with only futility boundaries, the following relationship should be 
met:  







For group sequential clinical trials with both efficacy and futility boundaries, the following 
equations should be satisfied for stopping boundaries and type I and II error rates: 

















Note that all the above conditions assume binding boundaries where the trial is stopped if futility 
boundaries have been crossed during interim analyses. Some clinical trialists prefer using non-
binding boundaries where flexibility is offered to interim analyses (Schüler, Kieser, & Rauch, 
2017). The trial can continue despite that futility boundaries are crossed and efficacy boundaries 
are derived regardless of stopping for futility. That is: 







Notably, there are multiple ways to allocate the type I error rate into different stages, and 
thus, resulting in various types of stopping boundaries. Pocock (1977) considered the type I error 
rate allowed for each analysis, 𝛼𝑗, as a constant value smaller than the overall type I error rate 𝛼. 
O’Brien-Fleming (1979) considered very stringent decision thresholds at early stages and the 
decision threshold decremented with stages. Nowadays, O’Brien-Fleming boundaries are 
frequently used in evaluating treatment efficacy, because they require the observed treatment effect 
to be very convincing and they preserve a type I error rate close to that of a fixed-sample design 
(Chen, Ibrahim, & Chu, 2014).  
Other commonly used stopping boundaries include Haybittle-Peto boundaries (Haybittle, 
1971; Peto et al., 1976) and boundaries for the triangular test (Whitehead & Stratton, 1983). 
Haybittle-Peto boundaries assign the same type I error rate to all interim analysis, but consider the 
type I error allowed at final analysis to be 𝛼.  The biggest advantage of Haybittle-Peto boundaries 
is they allow reporting the final results under the pre-defined significance level 𝛼. Nevertheless, 
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the boundaries for interim analyses may be too stringent to terminate a potentially effective 
treatment. Whitehead and Stratton (1983) also developed stopping boundaries specifically for 
triangle test.  However, the triangle test is less used compared to commonly used classical group-
sequential test. 
1.2.4 Alpha Spending Function 
Notably, a limitation for stopping boundaries discussed above is they require all analyses 
to be evenly spaced in terms of time or patient enrollment. Therefore, the timing of interim analyses 
must be specified in advance (O’Brien & Fleming, 1979).  To overcome this issue, Lan and 
DeMets (1994; 1983) proposed alpha spending functions to provide flexibility such that clinical 
trialists can plan interim analyses at unevenly spaced time points. The alpha spent at each interim 
analysis is a function of the information fraction, denoted as 𝜏. The information fraction of the jth 
stage, 𝜏𝑗, is defined as 𝑛𝑗/𝑛𝐽, where 𝑛𝐽 is the maximum sample size required in the clinical trial. 
Lan and DeMets(1994; 1983) considered four types of alpha spending functions in their papers: 
𝛼1(𝜏) = 2 − 2Φ(𝑍𝛼/2/√𝜏), O’Brien-Fleming 
𝛼2(𝜏) = 𝛼𝑙𝑛(1 + (𝑒 − 1)𝜏), Pocock 
𝛼3(𝜏) = 𝛼𝜏
𝜃, for 𝜃 > 0, Power 
𝛼4(𝜏) = 𝛼[(1 − 𝑒
−𝛾𝜏)/(1 − 𝑒−𝛾)], for 𝛾 ≠ 0.  
𝛼1 and the increments 𝛼2 − 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑗−1 are the type I error rate allowed for the analysis at 
stage 1,2, … , 𝐽. Beta spending functions are developed to allocate the type II error rate into at each 
analysis in group sequential trials. Similarly, it is shown that beta spending functions control the 
overall type II error rate at a desired level (Anderson & Clark, 2010).  
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1.2.5 Frequentist Sample Size Determination for Group-sequential Methods  
For classical group sequential clinical trials, the sample size calculation methods have been 
discussed in the literature (Jennison & Turnbull, 2000; Lehmacher & Wassmer, 1999). Since group 
sequential methods allow early termination, a maximum sample size (MSS) and an expected 
sample size (ESS) should be calculated. The maximum sample size is the sample size needed if 
the trial is not stopping at any interim stages. Since the sample size is proportional to the Fisher 
information, the maximum sample size can be obtained if the maximum Fisher information is 
derived. The maximum Fisher information is also the inverse of the variance of 𝜋1?̂? − 𝜋2?̂?. For 
original Pocock and O’Brien-Fleming stopping boundaries, Jennison & Turnbull (2000) tabularize 
a constant ratio of maximum information of a group-sequential clinical trial design to the 
information of a fixed-sample clinical trial design. The constant ratio is a function of the type I 
error rate, 𝛼, the type II error rate, 𝛽, and the number of stages, J. For group-sequential design with 
error spending boundaries, efficacy stopping boundary values are derived recursively for given 
alpha spent at each stage, if there is an efficacy stopping rule. Then the maximum information is 
obtained so as to a desired type II error rate (statistical power) is satisfied. Overall, the final 





where 𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 and 𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 are the sample size and Fisher information for the fixed-sample clinical 
trial design, and 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum Fisher information for the group-sequential design. 
While the expected sample size is the sum of accumulated sample sizes at all stages, each 
multiplied by the probability of stopping at the corresponding stage. The expected sample size for 
a clinical trial with two stopping boundaries can be calculated as follow: 
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ESS =∑𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∪ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗)
𝐽−1
𝑗=1




1.3 Bayesian Methods  
 
Although frequentist methods have dominated clinical trials in the past few decades, they 
receive some criticisms from clinical trialists. One particular criticism is that the frequentist 
inference on 𝜋 is indirect as it calculates the conditional probability of ?̂? given the 𝜋. The indirect 
inference leads to misinterpretations of trial results. A common mistake some clinicians make on 
interpreting the p-value is they think p-value is the probability of the null hypothesis to be true 
(Cohen, 2011). However, the p-value does not refer to the probability related to the null hypothesis, 
actually, the p value should be interpreted as the probability to have a treatment effect at least as 
extreme as the observed value when the null hypothesis is true.  
In contrast to frequentist inferences, the other statistical paradigm, Bayesian methods, can 
assign a probability distribution to 𝜋 and calculate the probability of 𝜋 conditional on the observed 
data (Bayarri & Berger, 2004; D. A. Berry, 2006; J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). Therefore, clinical 
trialists are able to assign a probability to the hypothesis by using Bayesian methods. There are 
some other purported advantages for Bayesian methods, such as incorporating historical 
information for the treatment effect (D. A. Berry, 2006), as well as fitting naturally with sequential 
updating in group-sequential methods (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). In the following sections, an 




1.3.1 Bayesian Philosophy 
Although the establishment of the Bayes theorem by Thomas Bayes can date back as early as the 
18th century, Bayesian methodologies were not introduced into clinical trials until 1960 
(Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Cornfield, 1966, 1969; Cornfield & Greenhouse, 1967; Novick & 
Grizzle, 1965). Anscombe and Aumann (1963) brought up a Bayesian approach to analyze data 
from group-sequential clinical trials. Novick and Grizzle (1965) proposed a Bayesian probability 
model for clinical trials with categorical outcomes and discussed the usage of Bayesian priors. 
Cornfield (1966, 1969, 1976), along with Greenhouse (1967) have made several contributions to 
implementing Bayesian methods in clinical trials. He advocated using Bayesian approaches to 
monitor clinical trials. Although frequentist methods dominate the field of clinical trials in the 20th 
century, Bayesian methods are becoming increasingly popular for clinical trials in recent years. 
The development of Bayesian methods is largely due to the advances in computer hardware and 
software, which makes it feasible to compute-intensive algorithms in Bayesian methods, e.g. 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling methods. The formal support from regulatory agencies also 
helps popularize Bayesian approaches in clinical trials (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017). In addition, 
various standard Bayesian approaches to clinical trials were developed with the improvement of 
computer power (e.g. D. A. Berry, 2006; S. M. Berry et al., 2010; Freedman & Spiegelhalter, 1989; 
David J Spiegelhalter, Freedman, & Parmar, 1994).  
Philosophically, the Bayesian probability represents the degrees of certainty about a 
specific event, e.g. the success rate of a new treatment. In the Bayesian paradigm, there is a prior 
belief about the treatment effect 𝜋. The prior belief can be summarized from similar historical 
studies or be synthesized from the clinician’s opionion about the treatment effect. A probability 
distribution, called prior probability distribution, must be speficied for the prior belief. When data 
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is collected during the clinical trial, the prior belief about the treatment effect with the new 
observed evidence from the data. The resulting probability distribution, named the posterior 
probability distribution, represents the updated knowledge about the treatment effect. The posterior 
probability distribution is proportional to the product of the prior probability distribution and the 
likelihood of the observed data, which is also known as the Bayes’ theorem, or Bayes’ rule.  
Another important Bayesian philosophy is that Bayesian methods follow the likelihood 
principle. The likelihood principle states that all evidence of the treatment effect should come from 
the data, which ensures the posterior probability distribution of the treatment effect to be 
appropriate, as long as the prior distribution is specified properly (Diamond & Kaul, 2004; M. D. 
Lee, 2006).  
1.3.2 Bayesian Prior Probability Distribution 
As mentioned above, applying Bayesian methods in clinical trials starts with selecting a prior 
probability distribution. In clinical trials comparing two proportions, the prior distribution of the 
treatment effect is often specified as a beta distribution: 
 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, (1.1) 
where a and b are the shape parameters of the beta distribution. Such a beta prior takes the 
advantage of conjugation. To be more specific, with binomially distributed data, the resulting 
posterior probability also has a beta distribution and is easy to compute. The elicitation of Bayesian 
beta priors can be intuitive as well, as 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏)  can represent the mean or mode for the treatment 
effect (Fox, 1966; Gross, 1971). Morita et al. (2012) proposed the concept of prior sample size.  
The authors define 𝑎 + 𝑏 as the prior sample size for the clinical trials.  
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Note, there are several other formal ways to parameterize the beta priors in clinical trials. 
Thall and Estey (1993) suggested eliciting a beta prior using the prior mean 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏)  and the 90 
percentile probability interval, denoted as 𝑊90 , rather than specifying a and b. Such prior 
specification method is intuitive to clinicians. The authors also recommended to check the tails of 
the obtained prior distribution to see if the extreme values truly reflect the clinician’s opinion on 
the treatment effect. Ibrahim and Chen (2000) proposed power prior distributions for regression 
models, which combine heterogenous historical information from multiple previous studies to 
construct prior distributions. 
In addition, Berry and Stangl (1996) used the beta prior distribution assuming parameters 
are equal, that is 𝑎 = 𝑏. A beta prior distribution with equivalent parameters essentially indicates 
there is no or little prior information about the treatment effect. That is, clinical trialists do not 
know if the treatment is efficacious or harmful. The 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) distribution is commonly used as 
non-informative prior in clinical trials. This non-informative prior distribution put equal weight to 
all values of 𝜋 and maximize the information from data likelihood in the posterior distribution. 
Hence, Bayesian clinical trials using 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) as priors often produce results similar to results 
of frequentist methods (Lewis, Lipsky, & Berry, 2007). Other non-informative priors appear in the 
literature include a Jeffery’s prior 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(0.5, 0.5)  and a 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(0, 0)  prior. Lecoutre and the 
colleagues (2011) had considered using these two non-informative prior in their researches.  
However, some statisticians (Gelman, Simpson, & Betancourt, 2017; Greenland & Poole, 
2013) argued that non-informative priors put too much weight on implausibly large values of  𝜋. 
In contrast to non-informative prior, informative priors put changing weights on the values of 𝜋, 
therefore, delivery different information about the treatment effect. The informative priors in 
clinical trials can be categorized into two classes: optimistic priors and pessimistic priors 
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(Dersimonian, 1996; Fayers, Ashby, & Parmar, 1997). Optimistic priors (or referred to enthusiastic 
priors) are a class of priors that consider a beneficial treatment effect and the prior mean is greater 
than or equal the assumed treatment effect. While pessimistic (or referred as skeptical priors) priors 
consider a treatment effect is unlikely to be observed, and the prior mean is no greater than the 
assumed treatment effect. The main reasoning for skeptical priors is the clinical treatment effects 
are mostly small to moderate, so it may be too unrealistic to have a large treatment effect (Yusuf 
& Flather, 1995).  
Nevertheless, a problem for informative priors is to choose the appropriate prior probability 
distribution (Hughes, 1993). There are controversial opinions about the use of Bayesian 
informative priors. On the one hand, people believe prior selection is very subjective and can be 
easily biased (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). Wrongly specified priors can often obscure the results of 
treatment effects. On the other hand, Fayers et al. (1997) have justified the usage of prior in 
Bayesian methods. The authors suggested that a pessimistic prior can reduce possibilities to 
wrongly draw a conclusion that there is overwhelm treatment effect. As such, an optimistic prior 
can lower the chances that an effective treatment is early terminated for futility.  
1.3.3 Bayesian Posterior Probability Distribution 
While the prior distribution indicates the prior belief in the treatment effect, the posterior 
probability shows an updated knowledge about the treatment effect when data is observed. By 
Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability distribution can be obtained combining data likelihood 
with respect to the hypothesis and the prior probability distribution. Suppose there are 𝑦𝑖𝑗   patients 
having successful outcomes among 𝑛𝑖𝑗 patients by the jth stage, the beta prior distribution (1.1) 
for the ith treatment group in is updated to the following posterior distribution: 
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 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗), 𝑖 = 1,2 (1.2) 
The interpretation of Bayesian posterior probability is intuitive as the posterior distribution 
directly associate probability with the treatment effect 𝜋 (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). However, the 
derivation of posterior probability sometimes may require computation intensive methods such as 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling methods (Brooks, Gelman, Jones, & Meng, 2011).   
1.3.4 Bayesian Hypothesis Testing 
Based on (1.2), a Bayesian hypothesis test statistic T can be constructed to test the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ against the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆: 
 𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆), (1.3) 
where 𝑃𝑟(. ) denotes the probability function, 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 each follows the posterior probability 
distribution in (1.2). When 𝑇 is greater than some pre-specified decision threshold c, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The test statistic (1.3) is commonly used in Bayesian clinical trials as it can 
be nicely interpreted as the probability that the experiment treatment is superior to the control 
treatment by a minimal clinically significant difference. For example, Xie et al. (2012), Zaslavsky 
(2012) and Gsponer et al. (2014) used (1.3) or its variants in Bayesian hypothesis testing problems.  
Kawasaki et al. (2016) proposed a Bayesian equivalent test comparing two proportions 
which were based on a similar form of the posterior probability. Slightly different from (1.3), the 
authors defined a two-sided test using the posterior probability, that: 
 𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟(−∆< 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 < ∆), (1.4) 
where T  was also called the 𝜅 index by the authors and −∆< 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 < ∆ corresponded to the 
equivalence hypothesis test in the frequentist paradigm (Shuirmann, 1987).  Thus, both (1.3) and 
(1.4) were constructed under Bayesian frameworks, but close to test statistics in a frequentist 
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manner. Although the authors applied the index to analyze the data from a real clinical trial, the 
authors did not provide a clear guideline on how to make a decision based on the index.   
Nonetheless, the calculation of (1.3) and (1.4) may be difficult because the test statistic 
does not have a closed-form solution. Monte Carlo sampling techniques are frequently used to 
estimate the value of these test statistic (Zaslavsky, 2012). The normal approximation can be used 
to estimate (1.3) and (1.4) when ∆= 0 (Kawasaki et al., 2016; Zaslavsky, 2012). Remarkably, we 
developed an efficient algorithm to compute a bulk of values of (1.3) with different posterior 
distributions of  𝜋1 and 𝜋2. The details of the algorithm and improvements on the standard Monte-
Carlo sampling procedure can be found in the original paper (Yu, Ramakrishnan, & Meinzer, 
2019). 
Note, there are other ways to construct the Bayesian test statistic, T. Berger and Sellke 
(1987), Kass and Raftery (1995) and Marden (2000) used Bayes factors to perform the hypothesis 
test. The Bayes factor is the ratio of the likelihood probability of the alternative hypothesis to the 
null hypothesis. The larger the Bayes factor is, the stronger the evidence favors the alternative 
hypothesis. As such, a decision threshold c is required to conclude whether to reject the null 
hypothesis. Jeffreys (1961) provided the original decision threshold value tables for Bayes factors, 
in which he suggested a Bayes factor greater than 10 to be a strong indicator to reject the null 
hypothesis. Kass and Raftery (1995) proposed alternative definitions of the decision thresholds, 
for which the authors suggested a Bayes factor larger than 6 as strong evidence towards the 
alternative hypothesis. 
1.3.5 Bayesian Sample Size Determination 
Different from frequentist methods, there is no universal approach to determine the 
Bayesian sample size for hypothesis testing problems in clinical trials. Instead, there are multiple 
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ways to estimate the sample size for Bayesian clinical trials, depending on the specific Bayesian 
hypothesis testing procedure to use. Spiegelhalter (2004) had classified Bayesian sample size 
determinations into proper Bayesian methods, decision-theoretic Bayesian methods and Bayesian-
frequentist hybrid methods. The proper Bayesian’ approaches, namely, are a collection of methods 
to obtain sample size based on pure Bayesian methods.  For example, one of the proper Bayesian 
methods is to estimate the Bayesian sample size by calculating the minimum number of patients 
required for test statistic (1.3) to cross a pre-specified decision threshold c. Moreover, sample size 
determination methods with Bayesian methods as fundamentals can all be classified into proper 
Bayesian methods (De Santis, 2007; Joseph, du Berger, & Bélisle, 1997; M’Lan, Joseph, & 
Wolfson, 2008; Weiss, 1997). 
Although decision-theoretic sample size determinations are also built based upon Bayesian 
methods, the class of methods is designated in hypothesis testing under the Bayesian decision-
theoretic framework. The decision framework determines optimal sample sizes by maximizing a 
utility function or minimizing a risk function. A utility function measures several things that 
clinical trialists are interested in, e.g. the safety of the patients, the effect of the experimental 
treatment group. A risk function is the expected value of a specific loss function, e.g. mean squared 
errors. DasGupta and Vidakovic (1997) proposed a sample size calculation method regarding the 
posterior risk function. The authors sought the minimum sample size that kept the Bayes risk above 
a threshold value. Katsis and Toman (1999) later extended Gupta and Vidakovic’s method by 
adding a constraint which evaluated the likelihood of the Bayes risk function to exceed the 
threshold. Sahu and Smith (2006) also proposed an analytic procedure to determine the sample 
size using the Bayes risk function. The use of decision-theoretical methods, however, is rarely seen 
in real clinical trials (Müller, Berry, Grieve, & Krams, 2006). 
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Last, Bayesian-frequentist hybrid approaches combine Bayesian and frequentist methods 
together to derive the sample size for Bayesian clinical trials. The main reasoning underlying those 
approaches is to introduce uncertainty into traditional frequentist sample size calculations. An 
example is the predictive power approach (O’Hagan, Stevens, & Campbell, 2005; Whitehead, 
Valdés-Márquez, Johnson, & Graham, 2008). The Bayesian predictive power is defined as the 
expectation of the averaged power, give a specific prior distribution. In the predictive power 
approach, the power parameter in the classical frequentist sample size calculation formula is 
replaced by the Bayesian predictive power. The resulting sample size is considered being derived 
from a hybrid of Bayesian and frequentist methods. Alternatively, Wang et al. (2005) introduced 
uncertainty to the assumed treatment effect size. The authors replaced the assumed treatment effect 
size in frequentist sample size calculation with a Bayesian estimate of the treatment effect. Overall, 
hybrid approaches use Bayesian priors on frequentist methods, while many clinical trialists object 
to mixing frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials (Inoue et al., 2005). 
1.3.6 Bayesian Group-Sequential Methods  
Similar to frequentist methods, Bayesian methods can be applied to sequentially analyze 
clinical trial data. Considerably, Bayesian’s philosophy to update the knowledge about 𝜋 naturally 
fits the group sequential evaluation (Bayarri & Berger, 2004). Cornfield (1966) first suggested 
using Bayesian approaches to analyze data from group-sequential trials. A number of Bayesian 
group designs have been proposed in the past few decades (e.g. Rosner & Berry, 1995; Saville, 
Connor, Ayers, & Alvarez, 2014; Thall, Simon, & Estey, 1995). Like frequentist methods, specific 
stopping boundaries need to be determined in Bayesian group-sequential clinical trials. 
However, Bayesian stopping boundaries calculations are not as straightforward as those in 
frequentist methods. Typically, clinical trialists have to use computer simulations to determine the 
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stopping boundaries that meet certain criteria. For example, Thall et al. (Thall, Simon, & Estey, 
1995) constructed the stopping boundaries either to maintain equivalence or to achieve some levels 
of improvement in the experimental treatment arm compared to the standard of care. Lewis et al. 
(2007) used simulations to derive stopping boundaries that yielded type I and II error rates similar 
to frequentist methods. In addition, Gsponer (2013) argued to determine stopping boundaries based 
on clinicians’ opinions.  Zhu et al. (2014) adopted the frequentist alpha spending function 
introduced in section 1.2.4 into Bayesian group sequential clinical trials. However, the authors 
incorporated only the alpha spending function to determine the Bayesian efficacy stopping 
boundaries while assuming the futility boundaries to be decided by clinicians and to be constant 
across all stages. 
Currently, there are lots of early phase (i.e. phase I/II) clinical trials adopting Bayesian 
group-sequential methods (J. J. Lee & Chu, 2012). In comparison, there are less confirmatory 
clinical trials implementing Bayesian methods. This is because Bayesian models can be very 
complicated in confirmatory trials with large sample sizes, and may lead to substantial type I error 
inflation (FDA, 2010).  As the Bayesian paradigm does not naturally define the type I error rate, 
simulations are utilized to demonstrate control of the type I error rate. There is potential simulation 
bias that clinical trialist may choose specific Bayesian parameters for the null hypothesis to mask 
the type I error inflation (FDA, 2014; Lai, Lavori, W., & Tsang, 2015). Regulatory agencies are 
also more conservative and skeptical about the usage of Bayesian informative priors in 
confirmatory trials (FDA, 2014; ICH, 2017). As a result, there has been a long-time debate between 
frequentist and Bayesian clinical trialists about whether Bayesian methods should be used in 
clinical trials in place of classical methods (Efron, 2005; D J Spiegelhalter et al., 1994). 
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1.4 Reconciliations and Unifications 
Despite the long-running methodological debate on frequentist versus Bayesian methods in clinical 
trials, conflicts between these two methods roots in their philosophies. As discussed in sections 
1.2.1 and 1.3.1, frequentist and Bayesian methods have different definitions for probabilities. 
Other methodological conflicts in statistical applications between the frequentist and the Bayesian 
are discussed in the literature (Lindley, 1957; Little, 2006). The most famous one is the Lindley’s 
paradox (1957), where Lindley found that with some specific Bayesian prior distributions, 
frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis tests could produce opposite results. It is generally accepted 
these two paradigms are difficult to unify on the philosophical level. However, it is possible to 
resolve these conflicts on a methodological level (Bayarri & Berger, 2004).  
In the following sections, we present a summary of those existing methods. The review 
starts with methods contributed to general statistics and then narrows down to methods specifically 
developed for clinical trials. Since frequentist methods are more frequently used than Bayesian 
methods by the statistical and the clinical trial community for the past few decades, most of the 
reviewed approaches were developed to reconcile Bayesian methods on frequentist methods. Other 
literature seeks to resolve disagreements between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods. 
1.4.1 Reconciliation Frequentist and Bayesian Methods 
Several statisticians have sought correspondences between results of frequentist and Bayesian 
inferences in statistical data analysis (e.g. J. O. Berger & Sellke, 1987; Casella & Berger, 1987; 
DeGroot, 1973; Dickey, 1977; Pratt, 1965; Samaniego & Reneau, 1994; Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger, 
2007; Lindley, 1965).  
Many of the research work attempted to show Bayesian measures of evidence (i.e., 
posterior probabilities or Bayes factor) consonant with frequentist measures of evidence (i.e., p-
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values) in different hypothesis testing problems. For several hypothesis testing problems, it was 
shown that frequentist and Bayesian inferences can produce the same results (e.g. Casella & Berger, 
1987). That means the Bayesian posterior probability or Bayes factor is equivalent to the 
frequentist p-value. But in other hypothesis testing problems, Bayesian results seem to be 
irreconcilable to frequentist results (e.g. J. O. Berger & Sellke, 1987; Dickey, 1977). In general, 
those reconciliation approaches can be categorized into methods for two-sided hypothesis testing 
problems and one-sided hypothesis testing problems, Summaries of each approach are provided 
below.  
1.4.2 One-Sided Hypothesis Testing Problems 
Lindley (1965) showed that the Bayesian posterior probability distributions of test statistics such 
as 𝜒2 or F conditional on a large number of observed data can be approximated by the frequentist 
sampling distribution of the test statistic. Thus, the p-value can have a similar interpretation as the 
tail area of the posterior probability distribution.  
DeGroot (1973) further evaluated whether the frequentist p-value is compatible with the 
Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis in tests comparing an arbitrary sample with 
one or more than arbitrary reference probability distributions. The author defined a class of 
reference distributions and improper Bayesian priors so that the Bayesian posterior probability of 
the null hypothesis to be true matched the corresponding frequentist p-value. 
While DeGroot considered the reconciliation in the context of a relatively broad class of 
null hypotheses, Casella and Berger (1987) narrowed the class down to composite null hypotheses 
for the location parameter in one-sided hypothesis tests. Specifically, the authors looked at the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋 ≤ 0 versus the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜋 > 0. Casella and Berger assumed 
using Bayesian prior distributions that assigned equal mass to both the null and the alternative 
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hypotheses. In the end, the authors found that for certain reasonable priors, the Bayesian posterior 
probability that the null hypothesis to be true acquired the same value as the frequentist p-value. 
For other priors, the authors found that resulting Bayesian posterior probabilities encompassed the 
p-value, suggesting the p-value might be the lower bound or within the range of Bayesian evidence 
measures.  
Following Casella and Berger, Micheas and Dey (2003) explored the reconciliation 
between frequentist p-values and Bayesian prior and posterior predictive p-values using the same 
setting (i.e. one-sided test for a point null hypothesis for location parameter). The authors 
considered the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋 ≤ 𝜋0 versus the alternative hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋 > 𝜋0. The prior 
and posterior predictive p-values are defined as 𝑃𝑟(𝑌 > 𝑦0|𝜋 = 𝜋0) averaged over the prior and 
posterior distributions, where 𝑌 is the data from a model and 𝑦0 denotes the observed data (Box, 
1980; Rubin, 1983). Micheas and Dey found that the infimum of the prior and posterior predictive 
p-values is often the frequentist p-value, with a wide class of prior distributions. Later, Micheas 
and Dey (2007) extended their reconciliation to one-sided hypotheses for scale parameters. Similar 
results were found when the authors compared frequentist p-values and Bayesian prior and 
posterior predictive p-values for a number of priors. For many prior specifications, the infimum of 
Bayesian predictive p-values was equal to the classical frequentist p-value.  
Alternatively, Yin and the colleagues measured the reconcilability between frequentist and 
Bayesian methods in hypothesis tests with the presence of nuisance parameters (Yin, 2011; Yin & 
Wang, 2016; Yin & Zhao, 2013). Nuisance parameters are those parameters which are not of 
primary interest but still should be included in the statistical model when estimating the main effect. 
Inspired by Casella and Berger (1987), Yin and colleagues considered the same problem of testing 
one-sided hypotheses. However, the authors checked the reconcilability between the frequentist p-
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value and the Bayesian posterior probability with additional assumptions, e.g. tests for a scale 
parameter under an exponential distribution (Yin, 2011),  test for normal means (Yin & Zhao, 
2013) and tests location-scale parameters under a Weibull distribution (Yin & Wang, 2016). 
Results from Yin and the colleagues’ work suggested there was still a match between the 
frequentist p-value and Bayesian posterior probability under certain circumstances, in 
consideration of nuisance parameters. 
Altham (1969) considered the reconciliation problem within a slightly different context. 
The author investigated the relationship between Fisher’s exact probability and the Bayesian 
posterior probability resulted from analyzing a 2 x 2 contingency table.  Altham proved that there 
was an equivalence between exact probability and the posterior probability by using the identity 
between the incomplete beta function and the cumulative binomial distribution. The identity was 
mentioned earlier in publications of Hartley and Fitch (1951) and Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961). 
Zaslavsky and the colleagues (Zaslavsky, 2010, 2012; Zaslavsky & Scott, 2012) drew a similar 
conclusion on the relationship between Fisher’s exact probability and the Bayesian posterior 
probability. Differently, Altham calculated the Bayesian posterior probability in terms of the odds 
ratio, while Zaslavsky considered the Bayesian posterior probability in terms of the success rate 
difference. 
1.4.3 Two-Sided Hypothesis Testing Problems 
Although reconciliations between frequentist and Bayesian evidence of measure for one-sided 
hypothesis testing problems seemed feasible when specific priors were chosen, reconciliations for 
two-sided hypotheses were not always successful. 
Dickey (1977) considered the reconciliation between the frequentist p-value and the Bayes 
factor for the hypothesis testing problem with a point null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋 = 0 versus a two-sided 
38 
 
composite alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜋 ≠ 0. The author made an assumption that observed sample 
data were from a normal distribution. Furthermore, the Bayes factor is defined as the posterior 
distribution to the prior distribution, evaluated at 𝐻1 for 𝜋 = 0. At last, Dickey found that the 
frequentist p-value was consistently smaller than the infimum of the Bayes factor.  
Berger and Selke (1987) also considered reconciling frequentist and Bayesian measures of 
evidence in two-sample two-sided hypothesis testing problems with normal endpoints. The same 
hypotheses as in Dickey (1977),  𝐻0: 𝜋 = 0 versus 𝐻1: 𝜋 ≠ 0 was tested. However, the authors 
evaluated the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis instead of the Bayes factor. The 
posterior probability conditional on the observed data 𝑦 is defined as 𝑃(𝐻0|𝑦). The frequentist p-
value was calculated based on the same data. Berger and Selke found that regardless of which prior 
distribution was used, Bayesian approaches always yielded posterior probabilities above the pre-
defined decision threshold, leading to fail to reject the null hypothesis. On the contradictory, the 
calculated frequentist p-values were always less than the significance level of 0.05, which meant 
the null hypothesis should be rejected. Hence, a conclusion could be made that frequentist p-values 
and Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis were irreconcilable when analyzing a 
two-sample two-sided hypothesis testing problem assuming normal endpoints. 
Nonetheless, De La Horra (Horra, 2005) showed that it was possible to reconcile classical 
and prior predictive p-values in the two-sided hypothesis testing problems for location parameter. 
Following Micheas and Dey’s reconciliation work for location parameter on one-sided hypothesis 
tests (Micheas & Dey, 2003), De La Horra computed the prior predictive p-value by averaged 
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 > 𝑦0 𝑜𝑟 𝑌 < −𝑦0|𝜋 = 𝜋0), 𝑦0 > 0 over the prior distribution. The author found that for 




In addition, Dempster (1973), Aitkin (1997) and Smith and Ferrari (2014) explored the 
correspondence between frequentist p-value and the posterior in likelihood ratio test. Dempster 
(1973) proposed the posterior distribution of likelihood ratio (PLR) for hypothesis testing 
problems in the simple versus two-sided composite case. The PLR was defined as 
𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑅(𝜋, 𝑦) ≤ 𝜁|𝑦), where 𝐿𝑅(𝜋, 𝑦) was the ratio of the likelihood evaluated at the null to the 
maximum likelihood evaluated at the alternative, and 𝜁 was a decision threshold for the likelihood 
ratio test. Dempster further accessed whether the PLR might match the frequentist p value of the 
likelihood ratio test assuming data was from a normal distribution. Finally, the author found that 
when a uniform prior and 𝜁 = 1 were applied, the PLR equaled th p value. 
The same comparison between the PLR and the p-value was carried out by Aitkin (1997), 
and similar conclusions were reached. However, Aitkin (1997) extended Dempster’s (1973) PLR 
definition to more general distributions. But, as long as a smooth prior distribution and  𝜁 = 1 
were applied, the PLR asymptotically matched the the p value. Smith and Ferrari (2014) further 
made the reconciliation results between the PLR and the p value more generalized, to an invariat 
framework. The invariance property allowed establishing an equivalence between frequentist 
confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals. 
1.4.4 Fixed-Sample Clinical Trials 
While for general statistic, the literature review suggests that lots of efforts have been made to 
reconcile frequentist and Bayesian measure of evidence during statistical inferences. Successful 
reconciliations often require specific assumptions related to the hypotheses, endpoints and prior 
selection. Compared to two-sided hypothesis testing problems, one-sided hypothesis testing 
problems were easier for frequentist p-value and Bayesian posterior probability, or Bayes factor 
to achieve reconciliation. For clinical trials, several methods seeking the parallel between 
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frequentist and Bayesian methods have also been proposed. However, a large proportion of these 
methods are more focused at the design stage rather than the analysis or the inference stage. In 
addition, a lot of the reconciliation methods for the frequentist p-value and the Bayesian measure 
of evidence are not applicable to clinical trials. This is because post-adjustments on Bayesian prior 
distributions may be inappropriate and clinical trials it is more of interest to achieve the same type 
I or II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, as type I and II error rates are 
required to be strictly controlled (FDA, 2014). As stated near the end of section 1.1, we aimed to 
develop a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods for clinical trials with 
binary endpoints. The following sections are concerned with existing reconciliations or 
unifications between frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials. Details and limitations of 
each method are provided below. Since most Bayesian methods for clinical trials use one-sided 
hypothesis test and unification methods are developed either assumed there was only one stage or 
multiple stages, the related literature is categorized into methods for fixed-sample clinical trials 
and group-sequential clinical trials. 
Inoue, Berry, Parmigiani (2005) showed that frequentist and Bayesian methods can yield 
the same sample size at the design stage in single-arm clinical trials. The authors’ motivation came 
from the commonality between frequentist and Bayesian sample size determinations that both 
methods sought the minimum sample size to achieve certain goals.  Inoue, Berry, and Parmigiani 
first clearly defined the frequentist and Bayesian goal functions with respect to the sample sizes, 
respectively. Let subscripts F and B denote the frequentist and Bayesian parameter. The frequentist 
goal was to reach the power 1 − 𝛽 for an assumed treatment effect, meanwhile controlling the type 
I error 𝛼 at the desired level, and the sample size can be defined as: 




where ℕ denoted the set of integers, 𝐺𝐹(𝑛, 𝒖) denoted the frequentist goal function with a unique 
frequentist inputs u and the 𝐺𝐹
∗  was the desired level of the goal function and was held as a constant. 
While for Bayesian sample size calculation, the goal was to reach a targeted rate, named 
classification rate, for correctly making the decision whether to reject the null hypothesis 
conditional on prior distributions: 
𝑛𝐵 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑛 ∈ ℕ, 𝐺𝐵(𝑛, 𝒗) > 𝐺𝐵
∗}, 
where 𝒗 are Bayesian inputs for the goal function. Although goal functions were quite different 
for frequentist and Bayesian methods, the authors were able to reach a unification between 
frequentist and Bayesian sample sizes by setting 𝑛𝐹 = 𝑛𝐵 . Moreover, the authors identified a 
unique mapping between the assumed treatment effect in frequentist sample size calculation and 
the prior variance in Bayesian sample size calculation. To be more specific, the authors calculated 
the frequentist sample size for a given treatment effect and calibrated the variance of the prior 
distribution to produce the same sample size.  
The unification method developed by Inoue, Berry, Parmigiani (2005) had great 
significance because it unified frequentist and Bayesian methods at the design phase of clinical 
trials. As clinical trials required to analyze the data as planned, it was inappropriate to reconcile 
the frequentist and the Bayesian during data analysis. In addition, the mapping between frequentist 
and Bayesian methods on the sample size allowed clinical trialists to conduct clinical trials based 
on their own preference.  
However, there were several limitations to the unification method. First, it only considered 
single-arm clinical trials, while most modern clinical trials are designed to compare two or more 
treatments. Second, the Bayesian classification rate was not the same as the frequentist type I error 
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rate and is difficult to interpret it to clinicians. It could be difficult for a clinical trial using Bayesian 
classification rate while ignoring type I error rate to get approved from regulatory agencies as well. 
For instance, in the paper, the authors derived the same sample size between frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches when setting the frequentist assumed treatment effect to be 0.1, type I error 
rate to be 0.05 and the Bayesian classification rate to 0.9283. The meaning of 0.9283 is relatively 
hard to interpret and the classification rate did not guarantee the type I error rate of the Bayesian 
approach was also controlled at 0.05. In other words, the frequentist and Bayesian methods were 
unified at the design stage for the sample size, but not necessarily in the analysis stage for the same 
type I or type II error rates or conclusion. 
Zaslavsky (2010, 2012) considered reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian 
measures of evidence methods for several types of fixed-sample clinical trials. The author 
restricted the hypothesis tests to one-sided superiority or non-inferiority tests. Further, the author 
assumed using conjugate beta distribution with integer parameters as priors and 𝑇 =
𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) as the Bayesian statistic for hypothesis tests. Zaslavsky (2010) compared the 
Fisher’s exact p-value with Bayesian posterior probability under single-arm fixed-sample clinical 
trials with binary and Poisson outcomes. The author found the p-value can be smaller, equal or 
greater than the posterior probability for different choices of prior distributions. 
Later, Zaslavsky (2012) showed frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing results were 
reconcilable in two-arm fixed-sample clinical trials with binary endpoints. Under these conditions, 
Zaslavsky proved that a Fisher’s exact p-value can transform into the Bayesian posterior 
probability by adjusting the number of events y and total sample size n: 
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𝑃𝑟𝐹(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆|𝑦1 + 𝑎1, 𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 − 1, 𝑦2 + 𝑎2 − 1, 𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 − 1)
= 𝑃𝑟𝐵(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆|𝑦1, 𝑛1, 𝑦2, 𝑛2) + 𝑓(∆), 
where 𝑓(∆) is a well-defined function of ∆ by the author. By using this relationship, Zaslavsky 
found that p-values of Fisher’s exact test and Bayesian posterior probabilities were close when 
non-informative priors were used. Note, the relationship between p-values and posterior 
probabilities above was very similar to that established by Altham (1968) and Zaslavsky (2010). 
Here, the major difference was Zaslavsky (2013) extended the relationship to a more general null 
hypothesis, to include the minimally clinically significant difference, ∆.  
Publications of Zaslavsky’s research (Zaslavsky, 2010, 2012) had great importance 
because they showed connections between frequentist and Bayesian methods in clinical trials and 
proposed methods had potential usage in the comparison between frequentist and Bayesian 
methods. Biostatisticians were capable to use frequentist and Bayesian calculations 
interchangeably. For example, when the sample size was small, the Bayesian operating 
characteristics can be determined by using available software for frequentist methods, while for 
large sample size, frequentist characteristics can be computed using Bayesian simulations. 
However, it should be noticed that Zaslavsky’s approaches assumed exact test, non-informative 
priors with integer parameters, which restricted the use in planning clinical trials.  Also, the same 
p-values and posterior probabilities did not mean the final type I and II error rates were the same 
for frequentist methods and Bayesian methods. Thus, these approaches were less useful in 
designing practical clinical trials. 
In addition, Zaslavsky and Scott (2012) took a relatively different direction and worked on 
the reconciliation between frequentist and Bayesian methods for comparing the mean of multiple 
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single samples with a constant value. The authors set the problem for continuous and discrete 
outcomes that were commonly seen in clinical trials, e.g. normal or binary endpoints. Data from 
both distributions could be evaluated using a normally distributed test. Zaslavsky and Scott 
proposed a unified procedure of hypothesis testing problems involving adjustments for multiple 
testing, for frequentist and Bayesian methods. The unified procedure calculated order statistics 
using adjusted interval limits. The interval limits were defined as the confidence interval for 
frequentist methods and the credible interval for Bayesian methods, respectively. The modification 
on credible limits was similar to that on the confidence limits because the authors adjusted the 
credible limits with respect to an established concept of reconciling the frequentist p-value and the 
Bayesian posterior probability (Zaslavsky, 2010).   
Results from a numerical study indicated the family-wise type I error rate was controlled 
for both frequentist and Bayesian methods by using the unified procedure. However, to use order 
statistic for multiple testing is less popular than using other adjustments such as the Bonferroni 
correction. The authors also mentioned that computation could be an issue since the convergence 
of approximate estimates for the required sample size sometimes could be slow. 
1.4.5 Group-Sequential Clinical Trials 
Compared to methods for fixed-sample clinical trials which might focus more on the theoretical 
aspects, the reconciliations and unification between frequentist and Bayesian methods in group-
sequential clinical trials concentrated on the application aspects. Though clinical trialists seldom 
use frequentist methods and Bayesian methods together except for that FDA requires to re-assess 
a Bayesian confirmatory trial using frequentist test procedures, the possibility to combine 
frequentist characteristics and Bayesian methods in the same clinical trial is studied in the literature.  
For most of the unification methods in the literature, the authors wanted to control the frequentist 
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type I error rate, a concept to be strictly controlled as required by regulatory agencies, while using 
Bayesian methods. 
Lewis et al. (2007) developed a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework for two-arm group-
sequential clinical trials. The core of the decision-theoretic framework was a Bayesian utility 
function. The utility function measured several components including the benefits of treatment and 
the cost of future patient enrollment. An optimal Bayesian design was attained when the value of 
the utility function was maximized.  
When Lewis et al. configured the utility function to produce desired frequentist 
characteristics, results showed Bayesian methods required a smaller sample size compared to the 
frequentist methods. The main reason was that Bayesian clinical trials had more frequent interim 
looks than frequentist methods.  The authors found that the sample sizes of frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches were almost the same when setting the number of analyses for two methods 
to be the same and assuming a non-informative prior for Bayesian approaches. In addition to the 
sample size, the type I error rates were the same for frequentist and Bayesian methods when the 
non-informative prior was applied.  
Similarly, Ventz and Trippa (2014) reconciled frequentist methods and Bayesian methods 
in multi-arm multi-stage clinical trials within the Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. The 
authors defined the utility function to represent the cost of infrastructure in clinical trials and 
enrolled patients at each stage, and let the utility function to satisfy the frequentist characteristics 
with a constraint. As such, the optimal Bayesian design was obtained by maximizing the expected 
value of the utility function. The resulting Bayesian design preserved the optimal Bayesian 
characteristics and a Bayesian interpretation, while controlled the frequentist type I error rates.  
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Extensive numerical studies verified that the overall type I error rate was controlled as desired, for 
different specifications of the utility function.  
Although both Lewis et al. (2007) and Ventz and Trippa (2014) developed approaches to 
reconcile frequentist methods and Bayesian methods in clinical trials, it is relatively difficult to 
implement these approaches in real clinical trials. First, the usage of the decision-theoretical 
framework in clinical trials is rare. The decision-theoretical framework was less accepted and 
understood by regulatory agencies compared to Bayesian hypothesis testing based on the posterior 
probability (FDA, 2014). Second, the determination of the utility function can be very subjective 
and to interpret each element in the utility function and explain how each element could affect the 
final results can be confusing. Last, finding the optimal design often requires numerous simulations. 
The computation becomes intractable when the sample size is large.  
Notably, some other Bayesian methods than decision-theoretical approaches were 
developed in order to control the frequentist type I error. Zhu (2015) incorporated the frequentist 
alpha spending functions into Bayesian group-sequential designs. The authors proposed a 
simulation-based algorithm to derive specific efficacy stopping rules in Bayesian group-sequential 
designs. The algorithm first simulated a large number of samples from the posterior distribution 
of the statistic (1.3), assuming ∆ = 0. The efficacy boundary for the jth analysis is then determined 
as the (1 − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗)) ∗ 100% th percentile of the ordered simulated samples. The final results 
indicated that the frequentist type I error rate was well controlled at the desired level. Nonetheless, 
Zhu et al. did not consider introducing a corresponding beta spending function for futility 
boundaries. Instead, the authors made a claim that the futility boundaries were the same across all 
analyses and were determined based upon opinions of clinicians.  
47 
 
 Zhu et al. (2015) utilized a hybrid approach which consists of frequentist concepts and a 
Bayesian framework. The design utilized alpha-spending function and the results showed 
unification on type I error rate was achieved between frequentist and Bayesian group-sequential 
clinical trials in some scenarios. While for other scenarios, Bayesian type I error rates were smaller 
than the frequentist values. There were several noticeable limitations. First, the approach requires 
obtaining the posterior probability distribution using simulations, which could be time-consuming 
and generate simulation bias. The simulation bias could affect the efficacy boundaries. Second, 
the correlation between Bayesian posterior probabilities across stages was not considered in the 
simulation-based approach, which might lead to wrong alpha spent at each stage for the Bayesian 
methods. Third, prior distributions were not considered when computing the Bayesian efficacy 
boundaries. Finally, the way to specify futility boundaries and control them as fixed values are not 
common cases in clinical trials. Type II error rate was not well controlled and might inflate in the 
Bayesian methods. 
Shi and Yin(Shi & Yin, 2019)  proposed another method to control type I error rate in 
single boundary Bayesian group sequential trials. The method reduced the computation burden 
required by simulations and maintained the desired type I error rate. However, the authors did not 
consider stopping the trial for futility at the interim analysis. Although both Zhu et al. and Shi and 
Yin reconciled frequentist methods to Bayesian methods to some extent, the final results were 
sensitive to Bayesian prior specifications. To be more specific, the Bayesian type I error rate can 
vary because stopping boundaries are computed without taking prior distributions into account. 
Furthermore, the other frequentist concept, the type II error rate, may not be preserved as desired 




1.5 Appendix  
 
 
Figure 1.1 The workflow of the literature review. The review starts with understanding frequentist 
and Bayesian methods and their fundamental conflicts. Then the advantages and disadvantages of 
the Bayesian approach are reviewed to help crystalize our specific aims. Finally, existing methods 





Figure 1.2 Relationships among 𝛼, 𝛽 and c, distributions of the test statistic T under the null (the 
red curve) and under the alternative (the blue curve) in frequentist hypothesis testing. The c is 
determined as the threshold that the area to the right tail of the null distribution is 𝛼 and the area 






CHAPTER TWO: SPECIFIC AIMS 
A major limitation spotted from the literature review, is that there is no theoretical method in 
clinical trials to achieve the same type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian 
methods. Moreover, it should be noticed that many methods in the literature review require 
modifications on Bayesian priors to achieve the reconciliation or unification between two 
approaches. Nevertheless, it becomes inappropriate to make post adjustments on Bayesian priors 
when conducting clinical trial data analysis. In fact, any modification on the prior distribution can 
be inappropriate for clinical trials, because prior distribution is often specified to reflect the prior 
belief in treatment effect. Thus, novel unified approaches are needed to establish a correspondence 
between frequentist and Bayesian methods on type I and II error rates, without changing a specific 
Bayesian prior distribution. Since the Bayesian prior distribution is designated to be held fixed, it 
is possible to adjust the sample size and decision threshold for Bayesian methods to achieve the 
unification.  
In addition, some other limitations occurred in the literature for reconciliations or 
unifications between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods are summarized. Some previous 
work used very complicated analytic forms or simulations, which should cost a lot of time to 
implement (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zaslavsky, 2012; Zhu & Yu, 2015); some methods were conceptually 
complicated or were difficult to apply in clinical trials (Inoue et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2007; Ventz 
& Trippa, 2014); some results were not generalized enough, e.g. some methods was only 
applicable to single boundaries (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zhu & Yu, 2015). We also aim to address these 
limitations in our proposed approaches. Thereby, the following three specific aims are proposed. 
Reasonings underlying three aims are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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2.1 Aim 1. A unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in two-
arm fixed sample clinical trials with binary endpoints.   
First, the distribution of the Bayesian posterior probability will be derived. Second, a one-to-one 
mapping between frequentist and Bayesian methods will be established by utilizing the 
straightforward classical frequentist hypothesis testing framework. The one-to-one mapping will 
provide unified type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian methods. Third, a 
theoretical approach to determine the sample size and decision threshold for the Bayesian approach 
will be developed. Finally, a comparison is made between two approaches on type I and II error 
rate, the sample size will be made under different scenarios through a numerical study. 
2.2 Aim 2. A unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in group 
sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints.  
Aim 2 is concerned with harmonizing and frequentist methods in group sequential clinical trials. 
The distribution of posterior probability in Aim 1 will be extended to a multivariate case. Based 
on the multivariate distribution, theoretical approaches to calculate corresponding sample size and 
stopping boundaries will be provided. Detailed algorithms will be illustrated. Similarly, a 
comparison will be carried out between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods on type I and 
II error rates, the maximum sample size, the expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries. 
In traditional group sequential designs, alpha spending function and beta spending function 
are introduced at each analysis to achieve the desired overall type I error rate. Aim 2 is also 
concerned with applying alpha spending function and beta spending function in Bayesian methods, 




2.3 Aim 3. Implementation of the unification framework.  
Aim 3 is concerned with practical issues to implement proposed unification approaches in Aim 1 
and Aim 2. First, a complete investigation will be conducted to evaluate the influence of Bayesian 
prior specifications, allocation ratios, and numbers of analyses, on the final sample sizes. The 
results will then be compared to frequentist results, and a suggestion for choosing between 
frequentist methods and Bayesian methods will be given. Second, a user-friendly software 
application to implement the proposed unified approaches will be deployed online, so that other 






Figure 2.1 Linear progression of logic for three specific aims. The Aim 1 proposes a unified 
approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods applied to the simplest case in a clinical trial, which 
is the fixed-sample clinical trials.  Then the Aim 2 improves the specific Aim 1 and extends the 
methodologies to group sequential clinical trials, which is more commonly seen nowadays. Finally, 
Aim 3 considers the practical implementation and usage of two unified approaches proposed in 




CHAPTER THREE: SPECIFIC AIM 1 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a novel unified approach is proposed for frequentist and Bayesian methods 
in one-sided two-arm fixed-sample clinical trials with binary endpoints. It is assumed conjugate 
beta priors are used for Bayesian methods. The novelty in the proposed approach is, it unifies 
frequentist and Bayesian methods by generating not only the same type I error rate, but also the 
same type II error rate in the analysis. In Section 3.2 how the unification is achieved between the 
frequentist and Bayesian approaches is discussed. A theoretical argument for all the claims made 
is also provided. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present a one-to-one correspondence between frequentist 
and Bayesian designs in clinical trials with binary endpoints.  
3.2 Methods 
To compare the experimental arm and the control arm in a clinical trial, considering a similar 
setting as introduced in Chapter 1. The test of the following one-sided hypothesis is of interest: 
𝐻0: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ versus 𝐻1: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆ where 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 are success rates of the experimental 
arm and the control arm respectively, and ∆ is the minimal clinically important difference. Here, 
∆ is defined as the minimum change in outcomes to prove the experimental arm is clinically 
superior to the control arm. In order to conduct hypothesis tests, consider two elements introduced 
in Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, the statistic 𝑇 and the pre-specified decision threshold c. The evidence 
of 𝐻0 is rejected in favor of 𝐻1 when 𝑇 > 𝑐.  The details of frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis 
tests have been illustrated in Section 1.2 and 1.3, only a few notations should be emphasized here. 
A conjugated beta prior distribution for treatment i is specified, 𝜋𝑖~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, where 
𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are shape parameters of the distribution. The uncertainty about 𝜋𝑖 is updated when 𝑦𝑖 
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successful events are observed for treatment i in the clinical trial. A posterior probability 
distribution is used to represent the updated uncertainty, 𝜋𝑖~𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖). 
Further, let subscript F and B to denote parameters specifically for frequentist methods and 
Bayesian methods. The Bayesian statistic 𝑇𝐵 is constructed as the posterior probability that 𝜋1 is 
superior to 𝜋2 by at least ∆. That is, 𝑇𝐵 = Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆), which is the same as (1.3).  Here, the 
form of the posterior probability is chosen because it is intuitive to interpret. For example, the 
result of Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > 0.05) = 0.95 can be interpreted as “the probability of the experimental 
arm is better than the control arm by at least 0.05 is 95%”. The corresponding type I and II error 
rates for the Bayesian approach are defined as follows and can be simulated using Monte Carlo 
sampling techniques: 
 𝛼𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) > 𝑐𝐵|𝐻0),  
 𝛽𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) ≤ 𝑐𝐵|𝐻1).  
Bayesian methods do not necessarily lead to the same error probabilities as frequentist 
methods(FDA, 2014). Nevertheless, correspondences still can be established between frequentist 
and Bayesian methods on error probabilities. By definition, there is a tradeoff between the type I 
error rate, 𝛼 and the type II error rate, β when the total sample size 𝑛 is held fixed. For instance, if 
the value of 𝑐𝐵 increases,  𝛼𝐵 should decrease while 𝛽𝐵 should increase, where 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 denote 
the Bayesian type I and II error rates. Therefore, we propose a unified approach for frequentist and 
Bayesian hypothesis testing to produce the same error rates based on adjustments of Bayesian 
threshold 𝑐𝐵 and Bayesian sample size 𝑛𝐵 given that 𝛼𝐵 = 𝛼𝐹 and  𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽𝐹. Note, while previous 
methods have shown that it is possible to adjust priors and ∆ for the Bayesian tests to achieve the 
unification, we are reluctant to do so because priors and ∆ are often dictated as pre-specified 
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quantities of clinical interest in clinical trials, and thus, modification of these parameters can 
influence basic clinical assumptions.  
Consider the relationships among 𝛼𝐹 , 𝛽𝐹  and 𝑐𝐹  discussed by Lachin (Lachin, 1981) in 
frequentist methods in Figure 1.1, similar relationships among  𝛼𝐵 , 𝛽𝐵  and 𝑐𝐵  also can be 
identified if the null and alternative distributions of  Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) are known.  However, the 
distribution of Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) is highly skewed and does not have a closed-form solution. Thus, 
for the purposes of deriving a closed form solution that does not rely on simulation, a standard 
normal quantile transformation on Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) is applied and the resulting distribution can 
be well approximated by the normal distribution when 𝑛𝐵 is sufficiently large. 
Although, the method discussed here would hold for any continuous distribution, for 
convenience a normal approximation is considered. However, in most clinical trial scenarios, 
especially for those Phase III confirmatory trials, where prior information is realistically available 
and controlling frequentist characteristics is required by regulatory agencies assumption of 
normality has been found adequate.  Let η denote the transformed variable, that is, 𝜂 =
Φ−1(Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆)), where Φ
−1(∙) is the quantile function of the standard normal distribution. 
Still, let 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 denote the assumed treatment effects for the experimental arm and control arm, 
and  𝜋1̂ and 𝜋2̂ denote the treatment effect estimates for the experimental arm and the control arm, 
where 𝜋1̂ = 𝑦1/𝑛1 and 𝜋2̂ = 𝑦2/𝑛2. Let 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎1, 𝑏1) denote the prior for the experimental arm 
and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎2, 𝑏2) denote the prior for the control arm. The distribution of 𝜂  under 𝐻0  can be 





𝜇1 − 𝜇2 − ∆
√
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(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)
2
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𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)




where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are the hypothesized posterior mean for the experimental arm and the control arm 
respectively, and 𝜇1 = (𝑛1𝑃2 + 𝑎1) (𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)⁄  and 𝜇2 = (𝑛2𝑃2 + 𝑎2) (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)⁄ . 
Similarly, the distribution of 𝜂 under 𝐻1 can be approximated using the following normal 
distribution, where 𝜇.
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∗ = (𝑛1𝑃1 + 𝑎1) (𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)⁄  and 𝜇2
∗ = (𝑛2𝑃2 + 𝑎2) (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)⁄ . The Proof of 
the distribution of 𝜂 is shown blow: 
Proof 3.1 
Kawasaki et al. (Kawasaki et al., 2016) have shown that 𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆)  can be 
approximated by the CDF of a standard normal distribution. That is,  
𝑃𝑟(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆) ≈ Φ
(
 
𝜇𝑌1 − 𝜇𝑌2 − ∆
√
𝜇𝑌1(1 − 𝜇𝑌1)
𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1
+
𝜇𝑌2(1 − 𝜇𝑌2)
𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)
 , 
where 𝜇1  and 𝜇2  are posterior means of 𝜋1  and 𝜋2 , and 𝜇𝑦1 = (𝑦1 + 𝑎1) (𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)⁄  
and𝜇𝑦2 = (𝑦2 + 𝑎2) (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)⁄ . Here, 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 are two independent random variables and 








𝑛1𝑃1(1 − 𝑃1) 0
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]). 
Therefore, applying the delta method, the asymptotic distribution of  𝜂 = Φ−1(Pr(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆)) 






𝜇1 − 𝜇2 − ∆
√
𝜇1(1 − 𝜇1)
𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1
+
𝜇2(1 − 𝜇2)
𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1
,
𝑛1𝑃1(1 − 𝑃1)
(𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)2
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(𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)2
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𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1
+
𝜇2(1 − 𝜇2)
𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1)
 , 
where 𝜇1 = (𝑛1𝑃1 + 𝑎1) (𝑛1 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)⁄  and  𝜇2 = (𝑛2𝑃2 + 𝑎2) (𝑛2 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)⁄ .   Evaluated 
under the null and alternative hypotheses, distributions (3.1) and (3.2) are obtained. 
Notably, these two distributions are very similar to distributions of the frequentist test 
statistic,  𝑇𝐹, under 𝐻0 and 𝐻1. Thus, relationships among Bayesian statistic 𝑇𝐵, decision threshold 
𝑐𝐵 and type I and II error rates 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 can be established. Now, error probabilities, 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 
can be represented in terms of the null and the alternative distributions of 𝜂 and  𝑐𝐵. 





where 𝐹𝜂(∙) denotes the standard normal CDF function. Note that, unlike traditional hypothesis 
distribution, the distribution of  𝜂  under the null and alternative represent different normal 
distributions, but applying transformations (𝜂 − 𝜇𝜂) 𝜎𝜂⁄  results in an identical standard normal 
variable. Thus, the following equation can be derived from (3.3): 
             Φ−1(1 − 𝛼𝐵)𝜎𝜂,𝐻0 + 𝜇𝜂,𝐻0 = Φ
−1(𝛽𝐵)𝜎𝜂,𝐻1 + 𝜇𝜂,𝐻1. (3.4) 
By setting 𝛼𝐵 = 𝛼𝐹  and 𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽𝐹  and replace 𝑛1  with 𝑟 ∗ 𝑛2  in equation (3.4), it is possible to 
solve the sample size for the control arm. The calculation of (3.4) can be solved using an iterative 
root-finding process. The threshold value 𝑐𝐵 can be then calculated using either of the equations 
in (3.3) once the sample size is defined. That is: 
 𝑐𝐵 = Φ(𝐹𝜂,𝐻0
−1 (1 − 𝛼)) = Φ(𝐹𝜂,𝐻1
−1 (𝛽)). (3.5) 
The resulting sample sizes 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 allow us to generate the desired type I and II error rates.  
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Sometimes the planned optimal sample size is unachievable because of logistic constraints 
or too few available patients in clinical trials. In this situation, the maximum sample size and the 
type I error rate are often pre-defined, and we determine the power of the study through power 
analysis. In Bayesian methods, the Bayesian power of the trial can be calculated as follow: 
 
𝜑(𝑛𝐵) = 1 − Φ(






Table 3.1 provides an example in which the Bayesian sample size and threshold provides 
values which are equivalent to desired frequentist type I and II error rates. Assuming that 𝑃1 =
0.65,  𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, , with 𝛼 = 0.025 or 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.1, 0.15 or 0.2 in this example. 
Note that under the null hypothesis 𝑃1 = 𝑃2 = 0.5. Table 3.1 show that generated Bayesian type 
I and II error rates are consistently matched with the desired values for different values of 𝛼, 𝛽 and 
Bayesian prior distributions. The actual values may slightly deviate from the desired values due to 
rounding up in the root solution to the equation (3.4) when calculating the sample size. When 
different priors are used, the null distribution (3.1) and the alternative distribution (3.2) may shift 
as to satisfy the error probabilities. Accordingly, the threshold 𝑐𝐵 changes. All values of 𝑐𝐵 are 
large numbers and are close to 1 in Table 3.1, which is similar to what Zaslavsky (2012) suggested 
using in a Bayesian hypothesis test.  
Also, if 𝑛𝐵 and 𝑐𝐵 are already known, we can obtain 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 through the relationships 
defined in equation (3.3). That means if a Bayesian design is presented, a parallel frequentist design 
can be found to produce the same error rates. To derive the frequentist design is relatively simple 
when comparing to the Bayesian design. Once 𝛼𝐹 and 𝛽𝐹 are known, the sample size calculation 
formula is straightforward and has been demonstrated by Lachin(Lachin, 1981). Frequentist 
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threshold, 𝑐𝐹 , is defined as 𝑍1−𝛼𝐹  . Table 3.2 illustrate an example of finding equivalent 
frequentist designs for a given Bayesian design. Still, it is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 =
1, ∆= 0. Furthermore, we evaluate the parallel between frequentist and Bayesian methods for 
Bayesian total sample size of 250 or 500 and 𝑐𝐵 = 0.95. Finally, corresponding 𝑛𝐹 and 𝑐𝐹 for the 
frequentist design are obtained. The resulting type I and II error rates are still the same between 
frequentist and Bayesian methods. Notably, frequentist sample sizes are different from Bayesian 
sample sizes when an informative prior distribution is used. 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show comparisons of power between frequentist and Bayesian methods and 
Bayesian type I error rates, with the total sample size ranges from 150 to 300. Assuming that 𝑃1 =
0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 and 𝛼 = 0.05. Further, we evaluate Bayesian powers under three 
prior distribution combinations: 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) for both experimental and control arms, 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14, 6) 
for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10)  for the control arm, and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6, 14)  for the 
experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm. The last two indicate an enthusiastic and 
a pessimistic opinion about the treatment effect, respectively. The corresponding Bayesian 
threshold 𝑐𝐵 is determined using (2.5), given the sample size.  
As shown in Figure 3.1, the Bayesian power is close to the frequentist power when 
applying non-informative priors to both treatment arms. However, the Bayesian power is not 
equivalent to the frequentist power when using informative prior distributions. The Bayesian 
power is higher with an enthusiastic prior than that of a pessimistic prior. Nevertheless, the type I 
error rate remains almost the same between the frequentist and the Bayesian methods as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Hence, our approach unifies only the type I error rate when frequentist and Bayesian 
sample sizes are set to the same value. In addition, this power calculation formula is useful in a 
sensitivity analysis. When observing treatment effect estimates 𝑃1̂  and 𝑃2̂  which deviate from 
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assumed treatment effects 𝑃1 and 𝑃2, we can calculate the power by replacing 𝑃1 = 𝑃1̂ and 𝑃2 =
𝑃2̂  in distributions of 𝜂 under 𝐻0 and 𝐻1. 
Frequentist results and Bayesian results of our unified approach are compared through a numerical 
study. In the numerical study, several scenarios are investigated including a small treatment effect 
𝑃1 = 0.65 and  𝑃2 = 0.5  versus large treatment effect  𝑃1 = 0.7 and  𝑃2 = 0.4  and equal 
allocation 𝑟 = 1 versus unequal allocation 𝑟 = 2 using different priors. Assuming that ∆ = 0, 𝛼 =
0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.15,  we consider non-informative, optimistic and pessimistic priors for the 
experimental treatment arm in the numerical study. The optimistic prior assumes the experimental 
treatment is effective. For the small treatment effect scenario,  the optimistic prior for the 
experimental arm is set as 𝑎1/(𝑎1 + 𝑏1) = 0.65 while for the large treatment effect it is set as 
𝑎1/(𝑎1 + 𝑏1) = 0.8. While the pessimistic prior treats a treatment effect is unlikely to be seen, and 
is set as 𝑎1/(𝑎1 + 𝑏1) = 0.35 for the small treatment effect and 𝑎1/(𝑎1 + 𝑏1) = 0.2 for the large 
treatment effect. The prior for the control arm is always centered at 0.5, that 𝑎2/(𝑎2 + 𝑏2) = 0.5. 
In addition, the strength of the prior is taken into account. The strength is represented as the ratio 
of the sum of prior parameters to the final sample size. A stronger prior has more influence on the 
posterior than a weaker prior. For the small treatment effect scenario, a strong prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 +
𝑏𝑖 = 20 and a weak prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 10. While for the large treatment effect scenario, a 
strong prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 40, 𝑖 = 1,2 and a weak prior is set as 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 = 10. The results are 
shown in Table 3.3. The type I error rate and the power are generated from 10000 simulations 
using R for corresponding frequentist and Bayesian methods. 
The resulting type I and II error rates are comparable between the frequentist and the 
Bayesian methods. In all scenarios, type I and II error rates are approximately the same for 
frequentist and Bayesian methods. Frequentist and the Bayesian sample sizes are approximately 
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equal when using non-informative priors for Bayesian methods. However, Bayesian sample sizes 
are different from frequentist sample sizes when informative priors are applied. When applying 
optimistic prior distributions, Bayesian methods require smaller sample sizes than frequentist 
methods regardless of whether an unequal allocation ratio is used. For pessimistic priors, Bayesian 
methods require larger sample sizes than frequentist methods in equal allocation scenarios. In 
contrast, Bayesian sample sizes are smaller than frequentist sample sizes in unequal allocation 
cases.  
3.3 Conclusions 
In this paper, a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian one-sided hypothesis 
tests in two-arm fixed-sample trials with binary endpoints was developed. It is assumed that the 
Bayesian prior follows a conjugated beta distribution. The approach unified the approaches 
controlling for both type I and II error rates resulting from frequentist and Bayesian approaches by 
theoretically establishing a one-to-one mapping between these two methods. Unlike previous 
approaches that only controlled type I error rate in Bayesian clinical trials, the proposed unified 
approach preserves both type I and type II error rates at desired levels by incorporating Bayesian 
prior distributions into sample size and threshold determinations. Therefore, for Bayesian 
hypothesis testing, it is unnecessary to adjust the prior distribution to achieve the unification with 
frequentist methods. In addition, the assumptions are relaxed on priors and hypotheses to make the 
approach more generalizable for trials with binary endpoints. Conjugate beta prior parameters need 
not necessarily be integers and hypotheses include a parameter to represent the minimal clinically 
important difference. Also, theoretical methods for determining the sample size, threshold and 
power are provided. These methods do not require intensive computations or simulations. Under 
normal approximation to the posterior probability distribution, sample size and threshold values 
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were explicitly obtained. As mentioned in Section 3.2, our approach could be extended to any 
distribution. The normal approximation was chosen because in most clinical trials this seems 
reasonable. (To examine the validity of normal approximation, especially under small samples, a 






Figure 3.1 Frequentist and Bayesian power comparisons with total sample sizes range from 150 
to 300. We assume that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 and α = 0.05. For Bayesian methods, 
we evaluate their powers under three prior distribution combinations: 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1, 1) for both arms 
(the green curve), 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14, 6) for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm 
(the red curve), and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6, 14) for the experimental arm and 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10, 10) for the control arm 









Figure 3.3 Evaluation of normal approximation under different sample sizes and treatment effect 
sizes. Assuming that 𝑃2 = 0.3, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0  and non-informative prior distributions for both 
treatment arms. The total sample size varies from 20 to 110 and 𝑃1 varies from 0.35 to 0.65. The 
blue line represents the density curve of transformed posterior probabilities under the alternative 
hypothesis, 𝜂𝐻1 , and the red line represents the normal distribution used as the approximation to 
the distribution of 𝜂𝐻1 . From the figure below, it can be seen that the distribution of 𝜂 can be well 




Table 3.1  Some scenarios to evaluate the Bayesian type I and II error probabilities 𝛼𝐵 and 𝛽𝐵 
under different priors. Assuming that 𝑃1 = 0.65,  𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0 with 𝛼 = 0.025 or 


























𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 264 0.949 0.05 0.0477 0.8 0.801 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4) 306 0.956 0.05 0.0482 0.85 0.843 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 368 0.919 0.05 0.0502 0.9 0.911 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 338 0.955 0.025 0.0245 0.8 0.813 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 382 0.974 0.025 0.0233 0.85 0.844 





Table 3.2 Some scenarios to evaluate the frequentist sample size under different priors, Bayesian 
sample size and threshold. Assuming that 𝑃1 = 0.65, 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, we set a total sample 
size for the Bayesian method to be 250 and 500, with 𝑐𝐵 = 0.95. The frequentist type I error rate 
























𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 250 250 0.0493 0.0501 0.782 0.784 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4) 250 252 0.0574 0.0562 0.804 0.813 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3,7) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 250 246 0.0253 0.0253 0.674 0.681 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) 500 500 0.0496 0.0498 0.963 0.967 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(7,3) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6,4) 500 502 0.0565 0.0564 0.968 0.969 





Table 3.3a  Results of the numerical study comparing frequentist and Bayesian methods for the 
large treatment effect (𝑃1 = 0.65 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃2 = 0.5). Assuming that ∆= 0 with 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =
0.15, we report the sample size of the control group (treatment group 2). Let “F” denote frequentist 







arm 1 prior 
Treatment 
arm 2 prior 
Sample size of 
the control arm 
Threshold 
Type I error 
rate 
Power 











𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6.5,3.5) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 153 0.961 0.05 0.842 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3.5,6.5) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 154 0.924 0.048 0.841 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(26,14) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20) 152 0.981 0.0504 0.841 









𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(6.5,3.5) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 110 0.956 0.0485 0.856 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(3.5,6.5) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 111 0.93 0.0514 0.846 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(26,14) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20) 94 0.972 0.0523 0.855 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(14,26) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(20,20) 97 0.83 0.0506 0.861 
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Table 3.3b  Results of the numerical study comparing frequentist and Bayesian methods for the 






arm 1 prior 
Treatment 
arm 2 prior 
Sample size of 
the control arm 
Threshold 
Type I error 
rate 
Power 











𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(8,2) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 35 0.981 0.0496 0.852 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(2,8) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 38 0.805 0.0492 0.848 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(16,4) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10) 33 0.993 0.0492 0.837 









𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(8,2) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 22 0.963 0.0511 0.847 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(2,8) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(5,5) 23 0.794 0.0543 0.848 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(16,4) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10) 18 0.98 0.0458 0.848 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(4,16) 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(10,10) 20 0.534 0.051 0.835 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SPECIFIC AIM 2 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in fixed-sample 
clinical trials in Chapter 3, we propose another novel and theoretical-based unified approach for 
group-sequential clinical trials in this chapter. Similarly, the unified approach aimed to achieve the 
same type I and II error rates between frequentist and Bayesian methods for all analyses in group 
sequential trials. These analyses include interim analyses and the final analysis. When a frequentist 
design is given, the unified approach determines the Bayesian stopping boundaries and sample 
size through a theoretical approach. When a Bayesian design is given, the unified approach 
calculates the frequentist type I and II error rates, leading to a corresponding frequentist design. 
Alpha spending functions for controlling the overall type I error rate and beta spending function 
for controlling the overall type II error rate are used for the unified approach in Aim 2.  Similar to 
Aim 1, it is assumed that the group sequential trial still has two arms and binary outcomes. Beta 
conjugate priors and decision making based on posterior probabilities for treatment difference are 
used in Bayesian group sequential methods are used as well. Based on the approximate 
distributions (3.1) and (3.2), a joint distribution of Bayesian posterior probabilities is derived.  
Section 4.2 explained the novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential 
methods. In Section 4.3, numerical results that show the unified approach achieves the goal under 
various scenarios are present. The method is also applied to a trial application.  
 
4.2 Methods 
Assume the same parameterizations as in Chapter 3 and consider a group sequential trial 
comparing an experimental treatment arm to a control treatment arm that has 𝐽 stages, that 𝐽 ≥ 2. 
Let subscript 𝑗 denote the stage, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, where an analysis is carried out at the end of each 
72 
 
stage. Let 𝑛𝑗  denote the accumulated number of patients at the end of the jth stage. The one-sided 
hypotheses 𝐻0: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ≤ ∆ against 𝐻1: 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > ∆ are tested at the end of each stage. 
Further, let 𝑐𝐸,𝑗  and 𝑐𝐹,𝑗  denote the efficacy and the futility boundary for the jth stage, 
respectively. The trial with both efficacy and futility boundaries shall continue if the test statistic 
𝑇𝑗  at jth analysis, satisfying  𝑐𝐹,𝑗 < 𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐸,𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽 − 1 . Otherwise, the trial will be 
terminated early because the pre-specified stopping boundary has been crossed. The trial is stopped 
for overwhelming benefits of the experimental treatment if 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗,  or it is stopped for sufficient 
negative treatment effect if  𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗. The relationships among stopping boundaries, type I and II 
error rates have been illustrated in Section 1.2.3. 
Also, the expected sample size formula has been provided in Section 1.2.5, that is: 
ESS =∑𝑛𝑗𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑗 < 𝑐𝐹,𝑗 ∪ 𝑇𝑗 > 𝑐𝐸,𝑗)
𝐽−1
𝑗=1




Alpha and beta spending functions are considered for the unified approach. The alpha spent 
at each interim analysis is a function of the information fraction, denoted as 𝜏. The information 
fraction of the jth stage, 𝜏𝑗, is defined as 𝑛𝑗/𝑛𝐽, where 𝑛𝐽 is the maximum sample size required in 
the clinical trial. Further, three alpha spending functions introduced in Section 1.2.4 are considered 
here: 
(1). 𝛼1(𝜏) = 2 − 2Φ(𝑍𝛼/2/√𝜏), O’Brien-Fleming 
(2). 𝛼2(𝜏) = 𝛼𝑙𝑛(1 + (𝑒 − 1)𝜏), Pocock 
(3). 𝛼3(𝜏) = 𝛼𝜏
𝜃, for 𝜃 > 0, Power 
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𝛼1  and the increments 𝛼2 − 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝑗−1  are the type I error rate allowed for the 
analysis at stage 1,2, … , 𝐽.Similarly, the above functions can be applied to spend beta by replacing 
the 𝛼 parameter with 𝛽 parameter.  
Same as Aim 1, conjugate prior distributions 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, for the experimental arm and 
the control arm is considered. However, the posterior distribution is updated at every stage. At the 
end of the 𝑗th stage, 𝜋𝑖𝑗 follows a beta posterior distribution 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗), where 
𝑛𝑖𝑗 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗 are the number of patients and the number of patients with successful outcomes for the 
ith arm by the jth stage, and 𝑛𝑗 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑗
2
𝑖 . The test statistic, 𝑇𝑗 at the jth analysis, is the posterior 
probability that the experimental arm is superior to the control arm, 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗(𝜋1𝑗 − 𝜋2𝑗 > ∆). 
Similar to classical group sequential procedures, the trial will be terminated for sufficient 
evidences of efficacy when 𝑃𝑗(𝜋1𝑗 − 𝜋2𝑗 > ∆) is greater than the 𝑐𝐸𝑗, and will be terminated for 
futility when the posterior probability is smaller than 𝑐𝐹𝑗 .  Though type I and II error rates are not 
naturally defined in Bayesian methodologies, Monte Carlo simulations can be used to calculate 
type I and II error rates. For instance, to calculate the type I error rate for a Bayesian group 
sequential trials with double boundaries at the jth stage, L samples are drawn from the Bayesian 
posterior distributions under the null distribution, and then calculate the proportion of samples that 
the trial is stopped for efficacy: 







where 𝐼(. )  is an indicator function and the overall type I error rate is the summation of 











and the overall type II error rate is the summation of 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝐽.  Nevertheless, those simulation-
based calculations cost considerable amounts of time, especially at the designing stage when 
clinical trialists want to evaluate a number of Bayesian stopping boundaries. 
Therefore, a more efficient way is to derive a theoretical method to calculate the type I and 
II error rates directly from the posterior distributions of 𝑇1, …,  𝑇𝐽 . Notably, the posterior 
distributions of 𝑇1, …,  𝑇𝐽  are highly skewed and have no closed-form solutions. However, in 
Chapter 3 we have showed that the standard normal quantile transformation of the posterior 
probability 𝑇., denoted as 𝜂., can be well approximated by a normal distribution in two-arm fixed 
sample trials with binary endpoints, when the sample size is sufficient large. As such, in group-
sequential methods, the distribution of 𝜂𝑗 = Φ(𝑇𝑗)  can also be approximated by a normal 






𝜇1𝑗 − 𝜇2𝑗 − ∆
√
𝜇1𝑗(1 − 𝜇1𝑗)
𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1
+
𝜇2𝑗(1 − 𝜇2𝑗)
𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 1
,
𝑛1𝑗𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2)
(𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)
2 +
𝑛2𝑗𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2)
(𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2)
2
𝜇1𝑗(1 − 𝜇1𝑗)
𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1 + 1
+
𝜇2𝑗(1 − 𝜇2𝑗)






where 𝜇1𝑗 = (𝑛1𝑗𝑃1 + 𝑎1)/(𝑛1𝑗 + 𝑎1 + 𝑏1)  and  𝜇2𝑗 = (𝑛2𝑗𝑃2 + 𝑎2)/(𝑛2𝑗 + 𝑎2 + 𝑏2). Similar 
to frequentist group sequential clinical trials(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000), the normal 
approximation works well because sample sizes are enough large. Note, (𝜂1, 𝜂2, … , 𝜂𝐽) follows a 
multivariate normal distribution(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). The covariance between the 
transformed variables at any two stages  𝑗1and 𝑗2, 1 ≤ 𝑗1 ≤ 𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽, is 
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2 , 1 ≤ 𝑗1 ≤ 𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽, 
where 𝜎𝐹𝑗1
2 =  𝑛1𝑗1𝑃1(1 − 𝑃1)/𝑛1𝑗1
2 + 𝑛2𝑗1𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2)/𝑛2𝑗1
2  and 𝜎𝐹𝑗2
2 =  𝑛1𝑗2𝑃1(1 − 𝑃1)/
𝑛1𝑗2
2 + 𝑛2𝑗2𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2)/𝑛2𝑗2
2. A proof for the covariance is shown below. 
Proof 4.1 
Suppose there is a frequentist group sequential design with the same 𝑃𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝑛𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝐽. Let 𝑍𝑗1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑍𝑗2 denote the standard test statistics at the 𝑗1𝑡ℎ and the 𝑗2𝑡ℎ stages, 1 ≤ 𝑗1 <
𝑗2 ≤ 𝐽. The covariance between 𝑍𝑗1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑍𝑗2 has been derived by Jennison and Turnbull (2001), 
that: 




Further, write covariance of 𝜂𝑗1 and 𝜂𝑗2 as the covariance of functions of 𝑍𝑗1 and 𝑍𝑗2: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑗1 , 𝜂𝑗2) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑍𝑗1𝜎𝑗1 + 𝜇𝜂𝑗1 , 𝑍𝑗2𝜎𝑗2 + 𝜇𝜂𝑗2) = 𝜎𝑗1𝜎𝑗2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗1, 𝑍𝑗2). 
Replace 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑗1, 𝑍𝑗2)  with √𝜎𝐹𝑗2
2 /𝜎𝐹𝑗1
2 , the covariance of 𝜂𝑗1  and 𝜂𝑗2 is obtained as: 








The resulting multivariate normal distribution allows us to calculate Bayesian type I and II error 




𝛼𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (⋂Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗) ≤ 𝜂𝑗∗ ≤ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗∗)⋂
𝑗−1
𝑗∗
𝜂𝑗 > Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗)),     (4.2) 
 
𝛽𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (⋂Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗∗) ≤ 𝜂𝑗∗ ≤ Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗∗)⋂
𝑗−1
𝑗∗
𝜂𝑗 < Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗)).     (4.3) 
With the formulae to calculate Bayesian type I and II error rates, it is possible to obtain the 
same type I and II error rates for each analysis for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential 
methods. Let subscript F denote parameters for frequentist methods and subscript B denote 
parameters for Bayesian methods. Unification between frequentist and Bayesian methods is 
achieved by solving the following equations for parameters of one method when parameters of the 
other are given:    
 𝛼𝐹,1 = 𝛼𝐵,1 and 𝛼𝐹,𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝐹,𝑗 = 𝛼𝐵,𝑗+1 − 𝛼𝐵,𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽 − 1. (4.4) 
 𝛽𝐹,1 = 𝛽𝐵,1, and 𝛽𝐹,𝑗+1 − 𝛽𝐹,𝑗 = 𝛽𝐵,𝑗+1 − 𝛽𝐵,𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽 − 1. (4.5) 
𝛼𝐹,1 and 𝛽𝐹,1 are type I and II error rates distributed at the jth analysis using spending functions. 
Note, there are several other methods than spending functions to define stopping boundaries, e.g. 
boundary computation for triangular test(Whitehead & Stratton, 1983) and the recursive numerical 
algorithm proposed by Armitage et al.(P Armitage et al., 1969) But it is beyond the scope of this 
paper and will not be discussed in detail. But the same unification results can always be achieved 
between frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods as long as equations (4.4) and (4.5) 
are satisfied.  Notably, the stopping probability also becomes the same for frequentist and Bayesian 
methods for each analysis if (4.4) and (4.5) are both met.  
If a Bayesian group sequential design is given, corresponding frequentist group sequential 
methods to achieve the same type I and II error rates are derived using the unified approach. For 
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instance, in a Bayesian group sequential trial with double boundaries, 𝛼𝐵,𝑗 and 𝛽𝐵,𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, 
can be calculated using equations (4.2) and (4.3). Frequentist stopping boundaries and sample size 
are derived for given 𝛼𝐹,1,…, 𝛼𝐹,𝐽 and 𝛽𝐹,1, … , 𝛽𝐹,𝑗, that satisfy equations (4.4) and (4.5). Jennison 
and Turnbull(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000) demonstrated how to determine stopping boundaries and 
the maximum sample size for frequentist group sequential methods. 
Likewise, corresponding Bayesian group sequential methods are derived when a 
frequentist group sequential design is given. Similar to frequentist group sequential methods, 
Bayesian stopping boundaries are computed sequentially. However, detailed steps to determine 
Bayesian stopping boundaries considering prior influences may differ from frequentist steps. In 
equation (4.1), the mean of 𝜂𝑗  under the null contains the sample size parameter and is not centered 
at zero if informative priors are applied. Thus, the Bayesian sample size is estimated 
simultaneously when calculating Bayesian stopping boundaries. Algorithms for a single Bayesian 
boundary and double Bayesian boundaries computations are illustrated as follows. 
In group sequential methods with a single boundary, only one of efficacy and futility 
boundaries are specified, while the other boundaries are not defined. Resulting trials are stopped 
either for efficacy or futility. Use efficacy boundaries as an example, alpha spending functions are 
applied to control the overall type I error of group sequential trials. The relationship among the 
alpha spent, the efficacy boundary and the Bayesian sample size at the first stage is established 
below: 
 𝑃𝑟H0 (𝜂1 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,1)) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1)𝑑𝜂1
∞
𝑐𝐸,1
= 𝛼(𝜏1), (4.6) 
78 
 
where 𝑓(𝜂1) is the marginal probability density function of  𝜂1 . For the following stages, the 
increment of the alpha spent between 𝑗th and (𝑗 + 1)th stages should equal to the integral of the 
multivariate normal distribution of 𝜂1, … 𝜂𝑗+1 .  




∫ 𝑓(𝜂1, . . , 𝜂𝑗)𝑑𝜂1…𝑑𝜂𝑗
∞
𝑐𝐸,𝑗
= 𝛼(𝜏𝑗) − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗−1), 𝑗 = 2,… , 𝐽. 
(4.7) 
 
Bayesian power is defined as: 
 1 − 𝛽 = 𝑃𝑟H1 (⋃𝑗
𝐽𝜂𝑗 > Φ(𝑐𝐸,𝑗)). (4.8) 
The algorithm to compute the efficacy boundaries and Bayesian sample size works as 
follows: 
1. Calculate the type I error rate spent at stage j in the Bayesian group sequential method, that 
is, 𝛼𝐵(𝜏1), 𝛼𝐵(𝜏2) − 𝛼𝐵(𝜏1),… , 𝛼𝐵(𝜏𝐽) − 𝛼𝐵(𝜏𝐽−1). In the unified approach, the type I 
error rate spent at each stage in the Bayesian method is set to the same as that in the 
frequentist method, as stated in equation (4). 
2. Select a possible range of maximum sample size from 𝑛0 to 𝑛𝑀 , 𝑛0  ≤ 𝑛𝑀 , denoted as 
{𝑛0, 𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑀}. Choose an initial value of the maximum sample size, e.g. 𝑛 = 𝑛0. 
3. Compute the efficacy boundaries for the first interim analysis, 𝑐𝐸,1, by plugging sample 
size parameter 𝑛 into equation (4.6). Solve 𝑐𝐸,2,…, 𝑐𝐸,J sequentially using equation (4.7). 
4. Compute the power 1 − 𝛽∗, using the equation (4.8).  
5. Since the power is a monotone function of the sample size when holding the type I error 
rate fixed. Iterate over values in {𝑛0, 𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑀}, repeat steps 3 and 4 until the difference 
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between 1 − 𝛽∗ and to 1 − 𝛽 is smaller than some pre-specified margin of error, 𝜀, that is, 
|𝛽∗ − 𝛽| < 𝜀. 𝜀 is a small number, i.e. 1𝑒 − 4.  The final n is the maximum sample size 
and 𝑐𝐸,1, 𝑐𝐸,2,…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 are corresponding efficacy boundaries.  
Optimizations such as bisection methods can be implemented to reduce the time to search for the 
maximum sample size parameter n.  
The bisection method proceeds as follows:  
1) For the possible range of maximum sample size, {𝑛0, 𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑀}, define the minimum 
value as MIN = 𝑛0 and the maximum value as MAX = 𝑛𝑀. Define the midpoint as the 
mean of MIN and MAX rounded down to the nearest integer, that is, MID = 
floor(1 2⁄ (𝑛
0 + 𝑛𝑀)). Compute Bayesian powers 1 − 𝛽∗ in step 4 for MAX and MIN, 
respectively. Calculate differences between resulting Bayesian powers and the desired 
power 1 − 𝛽 for MAX and MIN, denoted as 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 ) and 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝑁).  Note, 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 ) 
and 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝑁) should have opposite signs. 
2) Compute the difference between Bayesian power calculated in step 4 using 𝑀𝐼𝐷 and 
the desired power, denoted as 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝐷 ). 
3) If 𝐷(𝑀𝐼𝐷 ) has the opposite sign of 𝐷(𝑀𝐴𝑋 ), update the MIN as 1MIN MID= + . 
Otherwise, update the MAX as 1MAX MID= − . Next, the new MID value is updated as 
floor(1 2⁄ (𝑛
0 + 𝑛𝑀)).  
4) Repeat step 2 and 3 until MAX MIN . The final maximum sample size is n = MIN. 
Steps of calculating for futility boundaries are very much the same as for efficacy boundaries. The 
few changes in steps for futility boundaries computation are to replace the alpha spending function 
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with the beta spending function and search for the maximum sample size until the overall type I 
error rate 𝑃𝑟H0 (⋂𝑗
𝐽−1𝜂𝑗 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝑗) ∩ 𝜂𝐽 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐹,𝐽)) converges to the desired type I error rate. 
2.5. Bayesian Group Sequential Methods with Double Boundaries 
Many group sequential trials implement both efficacy and futility boundaries. Alpha and beta 
spending functions are applied to maintain the overall type I and II error rates for trials. Stopping 
boundary values for the first interim analysis are computed using the following equations:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝐻0 (𝜂1 ≥ Φ(𝑐𝐸,1)) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1)𝑑𝜂1
∞
𝑐𝐸,1
= 𝛼(𝜏1), (4.9) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝐻1 (𝜂1 < Φ(𝑐𝐹,1)) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜂1)𝑑𝜂1
𝑐𝐹,1
−∞
= 𝛽(𝜏1). (4.10) 
Notably, there are two different ways to calculate the following boundary values. The first 
approach binds efficacy boundaries with futility boundaries. That is, the trial is terminated when 
any futility boundary has been crossed. Following equations are used to calculate efficacy and 
futility boundaries for the jth stage, 𝑗 = 2,… , 𝐽. 





∫ 𝑓(𝜂1, . . , 𝜂𝑗)𝑑𝜂1…𝑑𝜂𝑗
∞
𝑐𝐸,𝑗
= 𝛼(𝜏𝑗) − 𝛼(𝜏𝑗−1), 
(4.11) 








∫ 𝑓(𝜂1, . . , 𝜂𝑗)𝑑𝜂1…𝑑𝜂𝑗
∞
𝑐𝐸,𝑗
= 𝛽(𝜏𝑗) − 𝛽(𝜏𝑗−1). 
And the power is defined as  
 







Oppositely, the second approach considers unbinding futility boundaries. The trial can continue 
even if a futility boundary has been crossed. In this approach, steps to obtain efficacy boundaries 
are the same as equation (4.7) in the single efficacy boundary calculation. While futility boundaries 
computation is the same as equation (4.12). 
The algorithm to compute binding stopping boundaries and the maximum sample size in 
Bayesian group sequential methods work as follows: 
1. Calculate the type I and II error rates spent at stage j, that is, 𝛼𝐵(𝜏1),  𝛼𝐵(𝜏2) −
𝛼𝐵(𝜏1),… , 𝛼𝐵(𝜏𝐽) − 𝛼𝐵(𝜏𝐽−1)  and 𝛽𝐵(𝜏1), 𝛽𝐵(𝜏2) − 𝛽𝐵(𝜏1),… , 𝛽𝐵(𝜏𝐽) − 𝛽𝐵(𝜏𝐽−1) . In 
the unified approach, type I and II error rates spent at each stage in the Bayesian method is 
set to the same as that in the frequentist method, as stated in equation (4.4) and (4.5). 
2. Select a possible range of maximum sample size from 𝑛0 to 𝑛𝑀 , 𝑛0  ≤ 𝑛𝑀 , denoted as 
{𝑛0, 𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑀}. Choose an initial value of the maximum sample size, e.g. 𝑛 = 𝑛0. 
3. Compute efficacy and futility boundaries for the first interim analysis 𝑐𝐸,1  and 𝑐𝐹,1  by 
plugging sample size parameter 𝑛  into equation (4.9) and (4.10). Solve 
𝑐𝐸,2, 𝑐𝐹,2…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 sequentially using equation (4.11) and (4.12), set 𝑐𝐹,𝐽 = 𝑐𝐸,𝐽. 
4. Compute the power using equation (4.13).  
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5. Since the power is a monotone function of the sample size when holding the type I error 
rate fixed. Iterate over values in {𝑛0, 𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑀}, repeat steps 3 and 4 until the difference 
between 1 − 𝛽∗ and to 1 − 𝛽 is smaller than some pre-specified margin of error, 𝜀, that is, 
|𝛽∗ − 𝛽| < 𝜀. 𝜀 is a small number, i.e. 1𝑒 − 4.  The final n is the maximum sample size. 
𝑐𝐸,1, 𝑐𝐸,2,…, 𝑐𝐸,𝐽 and 𝑐𝐹1, 𝑐𝐹,2,…, 𝑐𝐹,𝐽 are corresponding efficacy and futility boundaries.  
For non-binding boundaries, step 3 is changed to compute efficacy boundaries 𝑐𝐸,1 and 𝑐𝐹,1 using 
equations (4.7) and (4.12). Similarly, using the bisection algorithm can reduce the computation 
time to obtain the maximum sample size. 
4.3 Results 
First, the stopping boundaries are evaluated with different prior specifications. Figure 4.1 
shows efficacy boundaries for Bayesian group sequential trials assuming single boundaries. It is 
assumed that 𝑃1 =  0.65 and 𝑃2  = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05  and 𝛽 = 0.2 . O’Brien-Fleming 
boundary, Pocock boundary, and power boundaries with 𝜃 = 1, 2  are compared under three 
different Bayesian prior combinations for treatment arms, including a non-informative prior, an 
optimistic prior and a pessimistic prior.  Beta(1, 1) distributions are applied to both treatment arms 
as non-informative priors. For the optimistic prior, it is considered Beta(13, 7)  for the 
experimental arm and Beta(10, 10) for the control arm, so that the prior favors the experimental 
arm. For the pessimistic prior, Beta(5, 15) and Beta(10, 10) are assigned to the experimental 
treatment and control treatment, respectively. Thus, the prior assumes a treatment effect is unlikely 
to be observed. Consider three analyses are planned for the trial, two of which are interim analysis 
to be conducted when 1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled. The information fraction, 𝜏, is used for 
drawing the x-axis in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 show efficacy and futility stopping boundaries 
assuming binding double boundaries. The efficacy boundary and the futility boundary are either a 
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Pocock type of stopping boundaries, or an O’Brien-Fleming type of stopping boundaries. Pocock 
and O’Brien-Fleming boundaries are chosen because they are commonly used in group-sequential 
clinical trials. It is assumed that Figure 4.2 uses the same 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑟, ∆, 𝛼 and  𝛽 as in Figure 4.1.  
When different priors are used, the null distribution and the alternative distribution may 
shift to satisfy the type I and type II probabilities. Therefore, Bayesian stopping boundary values 
vary for different Bayesian priors. In both figures, it can be seen that the efficacy boundary values 
are more rigorous for optimistic priors compared to those for pessimistic priors. Similar to 
frequentist stopping boundaries, O’Brien-Fleming and power with 𝜃 = 2 efficacy boundaries are 
more stringent at early stages compared to Pocock and power with  𝜃 = 1 boundaries in Figure 
4.1. The changing patterns for four types of efficacy boundaries are similar for non-informative 
prior and optimistic prior in Figure 4.1. While it is interesting to find efficacy boundaries have a 
larger variation between stages for pessimistic prior than other two types of priors. Also, values of 
Pocock and power with  𝜃 = 1  boundaries increases much from the first interim analysis to the 
second interim analysis. For double boundaries case in Figure 4.2, the futility boundaries for the 
optimistic prior is higher than that of the non-informative prior, and the futility boundaries for the 
pessimistic prior is lower than that of the non-informative prior. Similar to Figure 4.1 when 
pessimistic prior is applied, stopping boundaries values vary much between stages and the Pocock 
efficacy boundaries increase from the first interim analysis to the second interim analysis. In 
addition, the trial is less likely to stop early using O’Brien-Fleming futility boundaries than Pocock 
futility boundaries, especially when pessimistic prior is used. Overall, both figures indicate 
Bayesian prior as well as the type of stopping boundaries should be carefully evaluated and chosen 




Furthermore, Bayesian type I and II error rates and stopping probabilities are evaluated 
under the 𝐻1 for examples in Figure 4.1 and 4.2. Simulations are used to verify whether Bayesian 
type I and II error rates, as well as stopping probabilities are the same as desired frequentist values. 
Let 𝛼?̃? and 𝛽?̃? denote type I and II error rates at the jth analysis. The overall type I and II rates are 
denoted as ?̃? and 𝛽, that ?̃? = ∑ 𝛼?̃?
3
𝑗  and  𝛽 = ∑ 𝛽?̃?
3
𝑗 .  Let 𝑆𝑃𝐸?̃? and 𝑆𝑃𝐹?̃? denote simulated stopping 
probabilities under the 𝐻1 for efficacy and futility at the jth stage, respectively. Note, the actual 
Bayesian values, especially the early stage stopping probabilities may slightly deviate from the 
desired frequentist values due to the uncertainty of simulations and rounding up during stopping 
boundaries and sample size determinations. Results for simulated type I and II error rates based on 
single efficacy boundaries and binding double boundaries are summarized in Table 4.1 and 4.2; 
results for stopping probabilities are shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4. 
Table 4.1 shows simulated Bayesian type I and II error rates for each analysis and overall 
rates are consistently matched with desired frequentist values in the single efficacy boundaries 
case. Compared to previous methods proposed by Zhu et al. (Zhu & Yu, 2015) and Shi and Yin(Shi 
& Yin, 2019),  our unified approach is insensitive to the prior choice, therefore strictly control both 
type I and II error rates for Bayesian methods. For binding doublestopping boundaries in Table 
4.2, results are generally similar to the single efficacy boundaries. The Bayesian type II error rate 
generated at each analysis is close to the desired value of beta-spending functions, which means 
error spending function can be implemented to control type II error rate in Bayesian methods.  
As shown in Table 4.3, frequentist and Bayesian stopping probabilities for efficacy under 
the 𝐻1  are very close when non-informative priors are used in the single boundary case. 
Nevertheless, Bayesian stopping probabilities for efficacy can be different from frequentist 
probabilities when informative prior distributions are applied. This is because that the distribution 
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of 𝜂 under the 𝐻1 and stopping boundary values change with respect to prior distributions. As a 
result, stopping probabilities can also vary in Bayesian methods given different prior distributions. 
For the double boundaries case in Table 4.4, however, Bayesian and frequentist stopping 
probabilities are similar for all non-informative and informative priors. This is because both 
Bayesian type I and II error rates spent at each analysis are set to the same as frequentist values. It 
suggests that the proposed unified approach can produce the same stopping probabilities under the 
𝐻1  between frequentist and Bayesian methods when both efficacy and futility boundaries are 
present.  
Finally, the unified approach is applied to a group sequential clinical trial to demonstrate 
its application. Suppose there is a clinical trial designed to evaluate the therapeutic benefit of the 
intensive systolic blood-pressure treatment compared to the standard systolic blood-pressure 
treatment. The primary outcome is the proportion of patients who do not have severe disability or 
death at 3 months. Consider that the trial has a 1:1 allocation ratio and a single efficacy boundary. 
To preserve a nominal significance level at the final analysis that is close to that of a fixed-sample 
design, O’Brien-Fleming type alpha spending function are used to determine efficacy boundary 
values.  Furthermore, assume there are no covariates or interaction terms to be controlled for 
evaluating the primary outcome. The overall type I error rate is set to be 0.05 and the desired power 
is 85% for assumed a 20% increase of primary outcome, from 0.4 to 0.6, in the experimental 
treatment group. We evaluate the efficacy stopping boundary values (𝑐𝐸), maximum sample sizes 
(MSS) and expected sample sizes (ESS) under the alternative hypothesis for two-stages (an interim 
analysis carried out when 1/2 patients are enrolled), three-stages (interim analyses carried out when 
1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled) and four-stages (interim analyses carried out when 1/3, 1/2 and 
2/3 patients are enrolled). Originally, the trial is designed using frequentist group sequential 
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methods. Bayesian group sequential methods are derived using the unified approach. Bayesian 
methods are evaluated under three different prior specifications: a non-informative prior 
(Beta(1,1) for both treatment arms), an optimistic prior (Beta(30, 10) for the experimental arm 
and (Beta(20, 20) for the control arm) and a pessimistic prior (Beta(16, 24) for the experimental 
arm and (Beta(20, 20) for the control arm). 
Corresponding boundary values, sample size results are summarized in Table 4.5 and 
boundaries are also plotted in Figure 4.3. For boundary values, we use a standard normal scale for 
frequentist boundaries and posterior probabilities for Bayesian methods. When non-informative 
prior distributions are used for Bayesian group sequential methods, the Bayesian maximum sample 
size and expected sample size are the same as frequentist methods. The optimistic prior reduces 
the maximum sample sizes needed for Bayesian methods compared to frequentist methods, 
whereas the pessimistic prior does not increase maximum sample sizes much compared to 
frequentist methods. For three-stages and four-stages scenarios, optimistic priors reduce the 
expected sample size in Bayesian methods compared to frequentist methods as well. However, for 
the two-stage scenario, the Bayesian method with the optimistic prior has a larger expected sample 
size than the frequentist method. This is due to the fact that Bayesian stopping boundaries are very 
high and the stopping probability is very small at the interim analysis for the two-stage scenario 
(See Figure 4.3). The pessimistic prior requires slightly more expected sample sizes than 
frequentist methods. Notably, Bayesian stopping boundary values for pessimistic priors are much 
smaller than those for non-informative priors and optimistic priors (See Figure 4.3). Overall, 
optimistic priors do not always reduce the expected sample size in the unified approach and 
pessimistic priors may not increase the maximum sample size and expected sample size much. 
Clinical trialists should choose from frequentist and Bayesian methods by carefully evaluating the 
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operating characteristics, e.g. the number of interim analyses and Bayesian priors, when designing 
a group-sequential trial.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a novel unified approach for frequentist and Bayesian methods in one-sided two-
arm group sequential clinical trials with binary outcomes is developed. The approach unifies 
frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods on type I and II error rates. Additionally, the 
approach unifies stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with 
double boundaries. It is assumed that beta conjugate priors are used for treatment arms, and 
Bayesian decisions depend on posterior probabilities of the difference between the experimental 
arm and the control arm. The approach utilizes relationships among type I and II error rates, the 
stopping boundaries, and multivariate distributions of test statistics under the null and alternative 
hypotheses to achieve unification. Those relationships are well studied in classical group 
sequential methods(Jennison & Turnbull, 2000). Therefore, the unified approach is intuitive and 
can be applied in group sequential clinical trials. The approach also helps with the uptake of 
Bayesian methods into clinical trials as it reduces the computation and generates the same type I 





Figure 4.1 Bayesian single efficacy boundary values under three different prior specifications. It 





Figure 4.2 Bayesian double boundaries values under three different prior specifications. It is 





Figure 4.3 Bayesian efficacy stopping boundary values for a specified number of stages and prior 
distribution in the trial example.  It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.6 and 𝑃2 = 0.4, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 






Table 4.1 Type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with a 
single efficacy boundary. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three different 
prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =






𝛼1̃ 𝛼2̃ 𝛼3̃ ?̃? ?̃? 
O’Brien-
Fleming 
Desired Frequentist Values  0.000687 0.00489 0.0444 0.05 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.00072 0.00434 0.044 0.0491 0.196 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.000878 0.00498 0.0439 0.0481 0.209 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.0008 0.0051 0.0460 0.0519 0.205 
Pocock 
Desired Frequentist Values  0.0226 0.00836 0.019 0.05 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.0273 0.0075 0.0184 0.053 0.2 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0218 0.0099 0.0165 0.0482 0.205 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.0207 0.0088 0.0224 0.0519 0.198 
Power, 𝜃 = 1  
Desired Frequentist Values  0.0167 0.00833 0.025 0.05 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.0161 0.00911 0.024 0.0492 0.2 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0160 0.0103 0.024 0.0503 0.21 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.0177 0.00662 0.0257 0.050 0.197 
Power, 𝜃 = 2 
Desired Frequentist Values  0.00556 0.00694 0.0375 0.05 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.00526 0.00762 0.0344 0.0473 0.196 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.00644 0.0066 0.0421 0.0551 0.201 





Table 4.2 Type I and II error rates for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods with 
binding double boundaries. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three different 
prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 =











Desired Frequentist Values  0.000687 0.00489 0.0444 0.05 0.0264 0.0435 0.131 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.000788 0.00522 0.0436 0.0496 0.0264 0.0445 0.136 0.207 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0008 0.00468 0.0434 0.0489 0.0231 0.0563 0.127 0.207 




Desired Frequentist Values  0.000687 0.00489 0.0444 0.05 0.0906 0.0335 0.0759 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.0006 0.00532 0.046 0.0519 0.101 0.0305 0.0732 0.205 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0007 0.00566 0.0431 0.0495 0.101 0.0251 0.0768 0.203 




Desired Frequentist Values  0.0226 0.00836 0.019 0.05 0.0264 0.0435 0.131 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.0213 0.00808 0.0211 0.0505 0.0308 0.0394 0.123 0.194 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0213 0.00808 0.0211 0.0505 0.0308 0.0394 0.123 0.194 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.0226 0.00876 0.0198 0.0512 0.029 0.0386 0.118 0.182 
Pocock – 
Pocock 
Desired Frequentist Values  0.0226 0.00836 0.019 0.05 0.0906 0.0335 0.0759 0.2 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.0279 0.00624 0.0216 0.0558 0.0826 0.0341 0.0635 0.181 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0246 0.0092 0.0181 0.0529 0.107 0.0349 0.0616 0.204 




Table 4.3 Simulated stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods 
with a single efficacy boundary. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three 
different prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 
and 𝛽 = 0.2.   
 
Boundaries Prior for Treatment Prior for Control 𝑆𝑃𝐸1̃ 𝑆𝑃𝐸2̃ 𝑆𝑃𝐸3̃ 
O’Brien-Fleming 
Frequentist Method  0.0402 0.175 0.582 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.040 0.176 0.588 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.0409 0.17 0.580 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.0394 0.168 0.598 
Pocock 
Frequentist Method  0.343 0.139 0.314 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.347 0.138 0.311 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.341 0.15 0.305 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.299 0.142 0.361 
Power, 𝜃 = 1  
Frequentist Method  0.262 0.168 0.369 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.253 0.169 0.369 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.253 0.170 0.366 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.269 0.126 0.408 
Power, 𝜃 = 2 
Frequentist Method  0.139 0.166 0.487 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.137 0.168 0.5 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.149 0.158 0.492 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.115 0.201 0.473 
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Table 4.4 Simulated stopping probabilities for frequentist and Bayesian group sequential methods 
with binding double boundaries. Bayesian type I and II error rates are simulated under three 
different prior specifications. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 0.65 and 𝑃2 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 











Frequentist Method  0.304 0.316 0.332 0.0258 0.0435 0.135 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.302 0.313 0.335 0.0264 0.0445 0.136 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.306 0.345 0.3 0.0231 0.0563 0.127 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.303 0.312 0.33 0.022 0.0443 0.116 
O’Brien-Fleming 
– Pocock 
Frequentist Method  0.618 0.111 0.221 0.1 0.0294 0.0744 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.614 0.111 0.222 0.101 0.0305 0.0732 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.619 0.111 0.221 0.101 0.0251 0.0768 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.614 0.111 0.222 0.101 0.0315 0.0733 
Pocock – 
O’Brien-Fleming 
Frequentist Method  0.38 0.283 0.282 0.0264 0.0403 0.128 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.386 0.282 0.282 0.0308 0.0394 0.123 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.386 0.282 0.282 0.0308 0.0394 0.123 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.386 0.28 0.283 0.029 0.0386 0.118 
Pocock – Pocock 
Frequentist Method  0.613 0.175 0.163 0.0914 0.0336 0.0649 
Beta(1, 1) Beta(1,1) 0.611 0.170 0.162 0.0826 0.0341 0.0635 
Beta(13, 7) Beta(10, 10) 0.617 0.173 0.157 0.107 0.0349 0.0616 
Beta(5, 15) Beta(10, 10) 0.610 0.162 0.173 0.0819 0.0355 0.071 
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Table 4.5 Efficacy stopping boundary values (𝑐𝐸), Maximum sample sizes (MSS) and expected 
sample sizes (ESS) under the alternative hypothesis for example trial designed with frequentist 
and Bayesian group sequential methods with a different number of stages. It is assumed that 𝑃1 = 
0.6 and 𝑃2 = 0.4, 𝑟 = 1, ∆= 0, 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.15. O’Brien-Fleming type alpha-spending 




















Stage 1 2.538 0.994 0.999 0.953 
Stage 2 1.662 0.951 0.996 0.802 
MSS 174 174 164 176 
ESS 152 152 155 168 
Three-Stages 
𝑐𝐸 
Stage 1 3.202 0.999 0.999 0.917 
Stage 2 2.552 0.994 0.999 0.888 
Stage 3 1.662 0.951 0.996 0.806 
MSS 174 174 164 176 
ESS 150 150 139 152 
Four-Stages 
𝑐𝐸 
Stage 1 3.202 0.999 0.999 0.920 
Stage 2 2.552 0.994 0.999 0.890 
Stage 3 2.179 0.985 0.999 0.865 
Stage 4 1.698 0.954 0.996 0.816 
MSS 178 178 166 178 





CHAPTER FIVE: SPECIFIC AIM 3 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a long-time debate between frequentist and Bayesian 
clinical trialist on which approach is better. Rather than declaring one to be better than the other, 
Bayarri and Berger(Bayarri & Berger, 2004) had acknowledged that frequentist and Bayesian 
approaches can both play important roles in clinical trials. In fact, only a few parallel comparisons 
are made between frequentist and Bayesian approaches because of a lack of established 
correspondence between two paradigms (Inoue et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2007). To be more 
specific, frequentist and Bayesian clinical trialists may claim one paradigm is superior to the other, 
however, the targeted operating characteristics of two paradigms are quite different. Additionally, 
it should be noticed that many of the ‘frequentist vs Bayesian comparisons were carried out from 
the Bayesian clinical trialists’ side while few came from frequentist perspectives. Overall, a fair 
comparison should be made between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, while holding the 
operating characteristics such as type I and II error rates as the same.   
Considering the above issues, two novel unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian 
methods in fixed-sample and group-sequential clinical trials with binary endpoints are proposed 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The unified approaches allowed Bayesian and frequentist approaches 
to generate the same type I and II error rates. For Bayesian approaches, there is no need to adjust 
the prior distributions, but Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are calibrated to satisfy 
type I and II error rates. Hence, a detailed numerical investigation can be nicely performed to 
compare Bayesian and frequentist approaches in the unified framework for different design 




In this chapter, a deep investigation, motivated by a phase III trial for hemorrhagic stroke 
is conducted. First, the influences of different prior specifications and design parameters on the 
Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds are evaluated. Second, 
frequentist and Bayesian approaches are studied in a comparable manner. Finally, suggestions for 
making a selection between Bayesian and frequentist approaches for specific clinical trial designs 
are given. Section 5.2 briefly introduced the methods and Section 5.3 summarizes the results.  
5.2 Methods 
Consider the same two-arm phase III randomized stroke trial as the one used in a trial application 
in Chapter 4. The trial evaluates the superiority of the intensive systolic blood-pressure reduction 
treatment compared to the standard systolic blood-pressure reduction treatment after the onset of 
the hemorrhagic stroke. The primary endpoint is the proportion who do not have severe disability 
or death at 3 months and is binomially distributed. Patients are randomized into two treatment 
arms. The type I error rate and power are specified to be 0.05 and 0.85. It is assumed that the 
intensive systolic blood-pressure would increase the proportion of patients who satisfy the primary 
endpoint by 20%, from 0.4 to 0.6. In addition, it is supposed that there are no covariates or 
interaction terms when analyzing the primary endpoint. Originally, the trial is designed using 
frequentist approaches. However, it is re-designed and evaluated using Bayesian approaches, in 
order to compare Bayesian and frequentist sample sizes and decision thresholds under various 
conditions.  It is of particular interest to compare Bayesian and frequentist properties with different 
prior specifications, allocation ratios, and the number of analyses. 
The frequentist methods and Bayesian methods are derived for specific trial parameters 
using the unified approaches proposed in Chapter 3 and 4. Trial parameters include the Bayesian 
priors, the allocation ratio and the number of analyses. There are many prior elicitation methods 
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available, e.g.(Fox, 1966; Gross, 1971; Ibrahim & Chen, 2000; Wu, Shih, & Moore, 2008). An 
intuitive approach is used here to specify the prior distribution(Gross, 1971), in which prior mean 
centers at the prior belief about the treatment effect.  Prior sample size proposed by Morita et al. 
(Morita et al., 2012) is used to denote the sum of prior parameters, that is, 𝑎 + 𝑏. The larger the 
prior sample size is, the greater effect the prior distribution can exert on the posterior distribution. 
To evaluate the effect of prior sample size on Bayesian sample sizes, a range of 𝑎 + 𝑏 values are 
considered, while holding 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) to be fixed. 
Notably, prior distributions are categorized into three classes, the non-informative priors, 
the optimistic priors (or the enthusiastic priors) and the pessimistic priors (or the skeptical priors), 
based on the prior mean (Moatti et al., 2013). The non-informative prior minimizes the influence 
of prior on the posterior distribution and let data contributes most to the posterior distribution. The 
optimistic prior considers a beneficial treatment effect and the prior mean is greater than or equal 
the assumed treatment effect of the intensive systolic blood pressure reduction arm. The 
pessimistic prior considers a treatment effect is unlikely to be observed, and the prior mean is no 
greater than the assumed treatment effect of the standard systolic blood pressure reduction arm. 
 In this chapter, influences of Bayesian priors are first evaluated using a 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) non-
informative prior distribution. Then both optimistic and pessimistic priors are applied to the 
intensive systolic blood pressure reduction treatment group. Optimistic priors with mean values of 
0.8 and 0.6 are considered in the evaluation, while for pessimistic priors, mean values of 0.4 and 
0.2 are considered. For the standard treatment group, only pessimistic priors with a prior mean 
centered on the null hypothesis, i.e. 𝑎/(𝑎 + 𝑏) = 0.4 are considered.  
All evaluations are conducted using a user-friendly software application. The application 
has been developed and made accessible online to allow other clinical trialists to use the unified 
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framework when designing their clinical trials. PyQt framework is used to develop the frontend of 
the application and all algorithms are implemented using Cython. The interface of the application 
is presented in Figure 5.1. Users can simply enter the parameters in the input box, click and run 
to get the results. Note, the application also supports simulating operating characteristics for 
Bayesian multi-arm multi-stage design (Yu et al., 2019) using an optimized algorithm proposed 
earlier. Full documentation of the software application can be found on the website 
http://usebats.org/bats. 
5.3 Results 
Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are evaluated for five prior specifications 
mentioned above (prior mean of 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and the non-informative prior), with informative 
prior sample sizes ranging from 10 to 60 by 10. Here, prior sample sizes for the experimental arm 
and the control arm are held the same. For simplicity, it is assumed that patients are equally 
randomized to the experimental arm and the control arm. Further, assume there are two interim 
analyses planned when 1/3 and 1/2 patients are enrolled and only treatment efficacy is assessed at 
interim analyses. An O’Brien-Fleming type alpha spending function has been used to derive the 
efficacy boundaries. The type I error rate and power are specified to be 0.05 and 0.85, as stated 
above. Bayesian maximum sample sizes and expected sample sizes are plotted against the prior 
sample sizes in Figure 5.2. Bayesian stopping boundary values are shown in Figure 5.3. 
Corresponding frequentist maximum sample sizes, expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries 
are also calculated. Complete results are summarized in tables in Table 5.1. 
Figure 5.2 displays the trends of Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes for 
corresponding prior sample sizes. The dashed line represents the maximum sample size and the 
expected sample size for the 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(1,1) non-informative prior, which coincide with the frequentist 
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values. The maximum sample size reduces significantly for the optimistic prior with a mean  of 
0.8. As the prior sample size 𝑎 + 𝑏 increases from 10 to 60, the maximum sample size decreases 
from 170 to 150. Nevertheless, the maximum sample size does not change much for the other 
optimistic prior with a mean of 0.6. For two pessimistic priors, the maximum sample sizes are 
nearly the same as the maximum sample size for the non-informative prior. Similar patterns are 
observed for the expected sample size. The optimistic prior with a mean of 0.8 has the largest 
expected sample size reduction, while the other optimistic prior results in a negligible expected 
sample size reduction. Expected sample sizes for two pessimistic priors are slightly greater than 
that for the non-informative prior.  
Notably, stopping boundaries are also adjusted (see Figure 5.3). Stopping boundary values 
for optimistic priors are more rigorous than those for the non-informative prior. An optimistic prior 
with large prior sample size can produce rigid stopping rules across all stages. Conversely, 
stopping boundary values for pessimistic priors decrease as the prior sample size increases, and 
are smaller than stopping boundaries for the non-informative prior. Maximum sample size 
Next, allocation ratios 𝑟 = 1,2,3 are examined for the five prior specifications, assuming 
the same three-stage design with an O’Brien-Fleming efficacy boundary as above. In addition, 
consider prior sample sizes of 5, 7.5, 15, 30 and 45 for the intensive systolic blood pressure 
reduction group. A prior sample size of 15 is fixed for the standard treatment group. Figure 5.4 
and 5.5 present heatmaps of the maximum and expected sample sizes for each prior specification, 
the x axis represents the allocation ratios and the y axis represents the prior sample sizes for the 
experimental arm. The lighter the color of the cell in the heatmap, the larger the sample size is. 
The maximum sample size, expected sample size and stopping boundaries for the non-informative 
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prior case and the frequentist approach are summarized in Table 5.2. Complete results including 
stopping boundary values are included in Table 5.3. 
When non-informative priors are applied to treatment arms, the Bayesian maximum and 
expected sample sizes are similar to frequentist values if patients are equally allocated to two 
treatment arms (see Table 5.2). However, for unequal allocation ratios, Bayesian maximum and 
expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist values. Stopping boundary values do not change 
much with respect to allocation ratio changes. The maximum sample size increases as the 
allocation ratio become large. In contrast to the non-informative priors, the maximum sample size 
is constantly the smallest for all informative priors when allocation ratio 𝑟 = 2 (see Figure 5.4). 
While the maximum sample sizes are roughly the same between 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑟 = 3 the prior sample 
size of the experimental arm is smaller than that of the control arm. Notably, the ratio of prior 
sample sizes can affect the maximum sample size value. The maximum sample size increases as 
the ratio of the prior sample sizes of the experimental arm to the control arm increases.  
As such, the expected sample sizes are the smallest for allocation ratio 𝑟 = 2  for all 
informative prior. The expected sample sizes for 𝑟 = 3 is slightly smaller than that for 𝑟 = 1. 
Compared to frequentist approaches, Bayesian expected sample sizes can be less, equal or more, 
depending on the allocation ratio and prior sample size ratio. For equal allocation, Bayesian 
expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist expected sample sizes, when optimistic priors 
are used and prior sample sizes of the experimental arm are smaller than those of the control arm. 
For 𝑟 = 2, Bayesian expected sample sizes are smaller than frequentist expected sample sizes, as 
long as prior sample sizes of the experimental arm are smaller than those of the control arm. While 
for 𝑟 =3, the Bayesian expected sample sizes are consistently smaller than the frequentist expected 
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sample sizes. Results indicates the allocation ratio, as well as the ratio of prior sample sizes, can 
influence the Bayesian sample sizes.  
Further, the influences of the number of analyses on Bayesian maximum and expected 
sample sizes are assessed. Assume that patients are equally randomized into two treatment arms 
and the prior sample sizes are set to 30 for both treatment arms. The same type I and II error rates 
as above are used. Multiple numbers of analyses ranging from 1 to 6 are evaluated. Further, it is 
assumed that there is equal spacing between two scheduled analyses and O’Brien-Fleming efficacy 
boundary is used. Figure 5.6 shows the Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes plotted 
against a various number of analyses. Note, planning only one analysis leads to a fixed-sample 
one-stage trial. Hence, the expected sample size is reported as the maximum sample size. 
Corresponding frequentist maximum sample sizes, expected sample sizes and stopping boundaries 
are also derived. Complete results are summarized in tables in Table 5.4.  
From the results, it can be found that the Bayesian maximum sample size increases as the 
number of analyses increases, while the expected sample size becomes smaller when there are 
more interim analyses. Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes are close to frequentist 
values when non-informative prior is used. Similar to results of evaluations for prior sample sizes, 
applying optimistic priors lead to smaller maximum and expected sample sizes than corresponding 
frequentist sample sizes, whereas pessimistic prior lead to larger sample size values. 
5.4. Conclusion 
The Bayesian-frequentist debate in clinical trials has been there for a long time (Efron, 2005; David 
J Spiegelhalter, Freedman, & Parmar, 1994b). For Bayesian methods, the use of subjective 
Bayesian priors is also of concern to some clinical trialists. Rather than making assertive 
statements on problems, like which statistical paradigm is better, or whether Bayesian prior 
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information is good or not, this chapter focuses on evaluating these problems under different 
circumstances. An investigation is present to assess Bayesian prior influences on the maximum 
and expected sample sizes, decision thresholds, with varying prior sample sizes, allocation ratios 
and number of analyses. Meanwhile, comparisons between sample sizes of Bayesian approaches 
and sample sizes of corresponding frequentist approaches are made. The comparisons are objective 
because compared Bayesian and frequentist methods lead to the same conclusions. 
Results show that selection of different Bayesian priors, prior sample sizes, allocation 
ratios and a number of analyses can change Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes. 
Comparisons between Bayesian and frequentist results show that when non-informative priors are 
applied to treatment arms in Bayesian approaches, resulting in maximum and expected sample 
sizes are the same as frequentist values for most cases. Lewis et al. (Lewis et al., 2007) made a 
similar conclusion in a previous paper, but the authors compared a Bayesian decision-theoretical 
approach with the classical frequentist approach. Only exceptions are when unequal allocation 
ratios are used, indicating that Bayesian methods may be beneficial for sample size reduction in 











Figure 5.2 Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes with respect to prior sample sizes. Light 






Figure 5.3 Bayesian stopping boundary (decision threshold) value at each stage for different 
prior sample sizes. Light blue dashed lines represent stopping boundary values when non-






Figure 5.4. Bayesian maximum sample sizes with different allocation ratios and prior sample 





Figure 5.5. Bayesian expected sample sizes with different allocation ratios and prior sample 








Figure 5.6. Bayesian maximum and expected sample sizes with respect to the number of analyses. 
Light blue dashed lines represent the maximum and expected sample sizes when non-informative 




Table 5.1 Complete results of maximum sample size (MSS), expected sample size (ESS)  and 
decision thresholds for Bayesian methods when changing Bayesian prior sample sizes. Values for 







Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
0.8 
10 170 144 0.999 0.998 0.984 
20 166 140 0.999 0.999 0.995 
30 162 136 0.999 0.999 0.998 
40 158 132 0.999 0.999 0.999 
50 154 129 0.999 0.999 0.999 
60 150 125 0.999 0.999 0.999 
0.6 
10 172 147 0.999 0.996 0.969 
20 171 146 0.999 0.997 0.979 
30 170 145 0.999 0.998 0.986 
40 170 145 0.999 0.998 0.991 
50 170 145 0.999 0.999 0.994 
60 169 144 0.999 0.999 0.996 
0.4 
10 174 150 0.997 0.988 0.942 
20 175 150 0.993 0.981 0.933 
30 175 151 0.988 0.974 0.924 
40 175 151 0.982 0.966 0.916 
50 175 151 0.975 0.957 0.907 
60 175 151 0.967 0.949 0.9 
0.2 
10 175 151 0.991 0.971 0.901 
20 176 152 0.956 0.918 0.83 
30 175 151 0.882 0.83 0.741 
40 175 151 0.771 0.717 0.641 
50 174 149 0.629 0.593 0.536 
60 173 148 0.496 0.471 0.433 
Non-informative Prior 173 148 0.999 0.993 0.95 




Table 5.2 The maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for the Bayesian 
approach with non-informative priors and the corresponding frequentist approach, evaluating with 
different allocation ratios. 
Parameter 
Allocation Ratio 
𝑟 = 1 𝑟 = 2 𝑟 = 3 
Bayesian Frequentist Bayesian Frequentist Bayesian Frequentist 
𝑐𝐸 
Stage 1 0.999 3.202 0.999 3.202 0.999 3.202 
Stage 2 0.993 2.552 0.993 2.552 0.992 2.552 
Stage 3 0.950 1.662 0.948 1.662 0.947 1.662 
MSS 174 174 192 197 222 232 




Table 5.3 Complete results of maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for 
Bayesian methods when changing allocation ratios and prior sample sizes for the experimental 
arm. Values for frequentist approaches are also reported. 
Prior Sample 
Size for the 
Experimental 
Arm 
Prior Mean Allocation Ratio (The experimental arm to the control) 
1:1 2:1 3:1 
MSS ESS Stopping Boundaries MSS ESS Stopping Boundaries MSS ESS Stopping Boundaries 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
5 0.8 153 128 0.999 0.996 0.971 148 121 0.999 0.994 0.961 154 124 0.998 0.991 0.954 
0.6 155 130 0.998 0.993 0.958 148 122 0.998 0.99 0.95 154 124 0.997 0.987 0.943 
0.4 156 132 0.997 0.988 0.942 149 123 0.996 0.985 0.936 155 126 0.994 0.982 0.931 
0.2 157 133 0.994 0.98 0.921 150 124 0.993 0.978 0.92 155 126 0.991 0.975 0.917 
7.5 0.8 157 131 0.999 0.997 0.978 152 125 0.999 0.996 0.969 158 128 0.998 0.994 0.962 
0.6 159 134 0.999 0.994 0.963 153 127 0.998 0.992 0.955 160 130 0.997 0.989 0.948 
0.4 161 137 0.997 0.987 0.941 155 129 0.995 0.984 0.936 161 131 0.994 0.981 0.931 
0.2 162 138 0.991 0.973 0.908 155 129 0.99 0.972 0.911 162 132 0.988 0.969 0.909 
15 0.8 168 142 0.999 0.999 0.991 165 137 0.999 0.998 0.984 174 142 0.999 0.997 0.978 
0.6 172 147 0.999 0.996 0.975 168 141 0.998 0.994 0.966 176 145 0.998 0.992 0.96 
0.4 174 150 0.995 0.985 0.938 169 142 0.994 0.983 0.934 178 147 0.993 0.98 0.931 
0.2 176 152 0.978 0.949 0.868 170 144 0.979 0.954 0.883 178 148 0.978 0.954 0.888 
30 0.8 189 162 0.999 0.999 0.998 189 160 0.999 0.999 0.995 202 169 0.999 0.999 0.991 
0.6 196 171 0.999 0.998 0.987 194 166 0.999 0.997 0.98 205 172 0.999 0.996 0.974 
0.4 199 174 0.994 0.983 0.934 196 169 0.993 0.981 0.933 206 174 0.992 0.98 0.931 
0.2 201 177 0.942 0.888 0.781 197 170 0.954 0.917 0.828 207 175 0.957 0.925 0.846 
45 0.8 208 182 0.999 0.999 0.999 211 182 0.999 0.999 0.998 226 192 0.999 0.999 0.996 
0.6 218 193 0.999 0.999 0.993 217 188 0.999 0.998 0.987 230 197 0.999 0.997 0.982 
0.4 222 197 0.994 0.982 0.932 220 192 0.993 0.981 0.933 232 199 0.992 0.98 0.931 
0.2 222 197 0.9 0.827 0.696 220 192 0.929 0.877 0.775 233 200 0.938 0.897 0.807 
Non-informative 174 148 0.999 0.993 0.95 192 163 0.999 0.993 0.948 222 189 0.999 0.992 0.947 






Table 5.4 Complete results of maximum and expected sample sizes and decision thresholds for 




Prior Mean MSS ESS Stopping Boundaries 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
1 0.8 162 162 0.999 - - - - - 
0.6 170 170 0.986 - - - - - 
0.4 176 176 0.923 - - - - - 
0.2 176 176 0.738 - - - - - 
Non-informative Prior 174 174 0.949 - - - - - 
Frequentist 174 174 1.64 - - - - - 
2 0.8 162 139 0.999 0.998 - - - - 
0.6 171 148 0.998 0.986 - - - - 
0.4 175 153 0.975 0.925 - - - - 
0.2 176 154 0.836 0.741 - - - - 
Non-informative Prior 174 152 0.993 0.95 - - - - 
Frequentist 174 151 2.538 1.662 - - - - 
3 0.8 164 131 0.999 0.999 0.998 - - - 
0.6 173 140 0.999 0.995 0.987 - - - 
0.4 178 144 0.988 0.96 0.929 - - - 
0.2 178 145 0.883 0.803 0.752 - - - 
Non-informative Prior 176 143 0.999 0.982 0.953 - - - 
Frequentist 176 152 3.202 2.142 1.694 - - - 
4 0.8 165 126 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 - - 
0.6 174 134 0.999 0.998 0.994 0.988 - - 
0.4 179 139 0.993 0.976 0.954 0.932 - - 
0.2 180 140 0.905 0.84 0.794 0.761 - - 
Non-informative Prior 177 137 0.999 0.993 0.977 0.956 - - 
Frequentist 178 137 3.75 2.54 2.016 1.72 - - 
5 0.8 166 123 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 - 
0.6 175 131 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.993 0.988 - 
0.4 181 137 0.995 0.984 0.968 0.951 0.934 - 
0.2 182 138 0.923 0.866 0.824 0.792 0.768 - 
Non-informative Prior 178 134 0.999 0.997 0.988 0.974 0.957 - 
Frequentist 179 134 4.229 2.889 2.298 1.962 1.74 - 
6 0.8 166 121 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
0.6 176 130 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.996 0.993 0.989 
0.4 181 134 0.997 0.989 0.976 0.963 0.949 0.936 
0.2 182 135 0.937 0.884 0.846 0.815 0.791 0.772 
Non-informative Prior 179 133 0.999 0.999 0.994 0.984 0.972 0.959 
Frequentist 180 132 4.655 3.202 2.552 2.179 1.934 1.755 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we develop two unified approaches for frequentist and Bayesian 
hypothesis tests in two-arm fixed-sample and group-sequential superiority trials with binary 
endpoints. We assume the Bayesian prior follows a conjugated beta distribution and the Bayesian 
test is based on the posterior probability of rate difference. The idea of the proposed approaches 
for unifying frequentist and Bayesian methods is new and much improved compared to other 
proposed methodologies (Shi & Yin, 2019; Zhu & Yu, 2015). First, proposed unified approaches 
took Bayesian prior distributions into sample size and decision threshold determinations. As 
different priors can influence stopping boundaries and sample size and resulting type I and II error 
rates, taking the Bayesian prior into account controls type I and II error rates at the desired level. 
Second, a theoretical approach to determine Bayesian sample sizes and decision thresholds are 
provided, which does not require any simulation is very quick to compute. Last, varying binding 
and non-binding futility boundary were considered in the unified approach in Chapter 4, which 
was assumed to be constant(Zhu & Yu, 2015), or ignored(Shi & Yin, 2019) in previous work. 
Results from Chapter 3 and 4 show that type I and II error rates are consistently matched 
for all analyses, regardless of the Bayesian priors used. Frequentist and Bayesian methods differ 
philosophically, however, this dissertation shows that these two methods can be unified 
methodologically in group sequential trials, which can serve as a cornerstone of statistical analysis 
in clinical trials. The unified approach also lowers the entry for clinical trialists to use Bayesian 
methods in clinical trials, because the approach is developed using relationships commonly seen 
in classical clinical trials. A further investigation in Chapter 5 demonstrates that Bayesian prior 
specifications, as well as prior sample size, allocation ratio and the number of analyses planned in 
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clinical trials, can affect the final trial samples sizes. Therefore, frequentist and Bayesian methods 
can outperform each other under specific circumstances. It is suggested for clinical trialists to use 
the proposed unified framework at the trial planning stage to help make appropriate decisions on 
choosing Bayesian or frequentist approaches.  
6.2 Future Work  
There are several limitations to this dissertation. First, only binary endpoints are considered 
in this dissertation, while other regular endpoints, such as normal outcomes and time-to-event, are 
not discussed. Second, the methods currently are restricted to clinical trials with two samples, 
although proposed unified approaches have the potential to be extended to multi-arm multi-stage 
clinical trials. Last, the normal approximation to the transformed posterior probability might not 
be accurate if the posterior probability is extremely high (e.g. 0.9999999), as the distribution of 
posterior probability will be truncated at the upper boundary of one. 
Thus, we aim to tackle these limitations in the future through corresponding improvements. 
First, proposed unified approaches will be extended to clinical trials with normal and time-to-event 
endpoints. Whether the same type I and II error rates can be achieved will also be evaluated. 
Second, a multiplicity adjustment procedure will be incorporated into the unified approaches, to 
account for multiple comparisons in multi-arm clinical trials. Last, a truncated normal 
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